Pensions and fertility incentives

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Pensions and fertility: back to the roots

“…Becker 1960Becker , 1988Becker , 1991 and in broader discussions on the fertility decline in advanced economies. 1 In the public finance literature, it is well-established that the link between fertility and the public provision of pension insurance can be considered a special case of the social security hypothesis (Bental 1989;Prinz 1990;Cigno 1993;Cigno and Rosati 1996;Sinn 2004;Fenge and Meier 2005;Cigno and Werding 2007;Cremer et al 2008). Recently, the link between pensions and fertility has received increasing attention, also in the historical context of the first demographic transition (Guinnane 2011).…”

A Note on Child Policy and Fertility in an Overlapping Generations Small Open Economy: When the Labour Market Institutions Matter

“…With regard to the hypothesis of separated balanced budgets, we have followed the authoritative literature by Van Groezen et al [5], Fenge and Meier [20,21],Žamac [22] and Van Groezen and Meijdam [6], who analyse the case of the financing of public pensions and child allowances. The main reason for doing this is that the pillars of the public intervention have in practice separate budgets: for instance in several developed countries, public pensions systems, health systems, unemployment insurances, public child care and schooling are managed independently from each other.…”

Pensions with Endogenous and Stochastic Fertility

“…8 As in there, increasing k has only costs and no benefits. 9 The values of c and d that solve this problem depend on (the exogenous) value of r, as does the associated level of welfare, W * S (r). Moreover, it follows directly from (10) that W * S is an increasing function of r.…”

“…This condition requires that the cost of increasing k, which includes the extra cost of childrenn 0 (k) θ, equals the benefits associated with 8 The solution is thus identical to that under laissez faire with full private insurance. 9 This extreme result holds because, as with the laissez faire solution, there are no direct benefits associated with having children in this setting. To capture such benefits, one may include n as a separate argument of the utility function.…”