People Like Logical Truth: Testing the Intuitive Detection of Logical Value in Basic Propositions

Abstract

Recent studies on logical reasoning have suggested that people are intuitively aware of the logical validity of syllogisms or that they intuitively detect conflict between heuristic responses and logical norms via slight changes in their feelings. According to logical intuition studies, logically valid or heuristic logic no-conflict reasoning is fluently processed and induces positive feelings without conscious awareness. One criticism states that such effects of logicality disappear when confounding factors such as the content of syllogisms are controlled. The present study used abstract propositions and tested whether people intuitively detect logical value. Experiment 1 presented four logical propositions (conjunctive, biconditional, conditional, and material implications) regarding a target case and asked the participants to rate the extent to which they liked the statement. Experiment 2 tested the effects of matching bias, as well as intuitive logic, on the reasoners’ feelings by manipulating whether the antecedent or consequent (or both) of the conditional was affirmed or negated. The results showed that both logicality and matching bias affected the reasoners’ feelings, and people preferred logically true targets over logically false ones for all forms of propositions. These results suggest that people intuitively detect what is true from what is false during abstract reasoning. Additionally, a Bayesian mixed model meta-analysis of conditionals indicated that people’s intuitive interpretation of the conditional “if p then q” fits better with the conditional probability, q given p.

The Role of Intuition in Evaluative Judgment and Decision

“…This way of operating generates two kinds of intuitive responses: heuristic responses, which are based on stereotypical associations, and logical responses, which are based on automatically activated elementary knowledge of logico-mathematical principles. This brings up the question of hybrid models (Bago & De Neys, 2017; Banks, 2017; De Neys, 2012; Epstein, 1994; Handley & Trippas, 2015; Johnson et al, 2016; Nakamura & Kawaguchi, 2016; Pennycook et al, 2014, 2015; Sloman, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Thompson & Johnson, 2014; Trippas et al, 2016, 2017; Trippas & Handley, 2017). Bago et al (2018) developed a hybrid dual-process model in which the faster System 1 thinking cues both heuristic, belief-based responses (stereotypes) and elementary logico-mathematical principles (base rates).…”

The Psychology of Uncertainty and Three-Valued Truth Tables

“…It now appears that the empirical “defective” table for the conditional should be called the “2 × 2 de Finetti table” (and similarly for the “defective” biconditional) to avoid the negative term “defective” (Milne, 2012 ; Baratgin et al, 2013 , 2014 ; Nakamura and Kawaguchi, 2016 ). Notice (Table 1 ) that in columns 1 and 3 the empirical “defective” table bears a symbol ”I“ (for irrelevant ), whereas in column 1′ and 3′ the 2 × 2 de Finetti tables bear the symbol “∅” (for void ).…”

Logical Intuition Is Not Really About Logic

“…The goal of Experiment 2 was to replicate the findings of Experiment 1 and to investigate the relationship between our pseudo-logical conflict effects and cognitive ability. Contrary to expectations, it has been observed that logical intuitions are most likely to be observed amongst high-rather than low-ability reasoners (Erceg et al, 2019;Frey et al, 2017;Hayes et al, 2020;Raoelison et al, 2020;Šrol & De Neys, 2020;Thompson et al, 2018;Thompson & Johnson, 2014; but see, Ghasemi et al, 2021;Howarth et al, 2018;Markovits et al, 2020;Nakamura & Kawaguchi, 2016). The explanation given for this relationship is that high ability reasoners have learned (at least simple) logical inferences to the point of automaticity (Stanovich, 2018;Thompson et al, 2018), so that they interfere with the ability to make belief-based judgement.…”

“…In Experiment 2, we used the same materials and design, but presented participants with two measures of cognitive capacity. Whilst several studies have showed that reasoners with higher cognitive capacities have increased intuitive sensitivity to logical validity (Erceg et al, 2019;Frey et al, 2017;Raoelison et al, 2020;Šrol & De Neys, 2020;Thompson et al, 2018;Thompson & Johnson, 2014), others have failed to find such a relationship between logical intuition capacity and cognitive ability (Ghasemi et al, 2021;Markovits et al, 2020;Morsanyi & Handley, 2012;Nakamura & Kawaguchi, 2016). The goal of this experiment was to test whether higher ability participants are similarly sensitive to both logic and pseudo-logic structures.…”

“…However, more recent research suggests that the effect of logic on liking ratings may be less intuitive than originally thought, since they can be affected by manipulations (e.g., availability of time and cognitive resources) that hinder deliberative thinking (Hayes et al, 2020;Nakamura & Kawaguchi, 2016). Brightness judgments, on the other hand, are not affected by such manipulations (Ghasemi et al, 2021).…”