Perceived Distributive Fairness of European Transfer Payments and EU‐Taxes in Austria, the Czech Republic, and the United Kingdom

Abstract

The present research compared a distributive fairness model of EU transfer payments (Hartner, Rechberger, Kirchler, & Wenzel, 2011) between three countries: Austria, the Czech Republic, and the UK. The model postulates an interplay between EU‐tax compliance, distributive fairness, outcome favorability as well as national and European identification. Results across countries showed that EU‐tax compliance was positively related to distributive justice, which was in turn related to outcome favorability and identification. National identifiers perceived EU membership as unfavorable in financial and socio‐political terms, and thus considered the transfer payments as less fair. Dual identifiers perceived the socio‐political outcomes as more favorable, and thus evaluated the transfer payments as fairer. Although the basic structure of the model was valid across all three countries, two country‐specific results were found. First, in the UK individual tax paying behavior was influenced by outcome favorability, whereas in Austria and the Czech Republic this relationship was mediated via distributive fairness. Second, in the Austrian sample, the differentiation between patriots and nationalists proved fruitful since nationalists considered the EU transfer payments as unfair, unlike patriots. In the UK and the Czech Republic the distinction between nationalists and patriots did not add any further information.

Authorities' Coercive and Legitimate Power: The Impact on Cognitions Underlying Cooperation

“…French and Raven, 1959; Raven, 1992, 1993; Raven et al, 1998). For instance, wielding coercive power by threatening severe sanctions for unwanted behavior alone is not enough to explain compliant and cooperative behavior (Fehr and Falk, 2002); underlying cognitions such as expectations (Copeland and Cuccia, 2002), reciprocity (Feld and Frey, 2007), and fairness (e.g., Hartner-Tiefenthaler et al, 2012) additionally encourage cooperation. In line with these aspects, we argue that legitimate power, such as distributing information about what the “morally” desired behavior is and the expertly handling of members' contributions to the communal good, becomes important.…”

Election Outcome and Tax Compliance: The Role of Political Party Affiliation, Affect Balance, and Trust in Government

“…Prior research suggests that perceptions and beliefs influence tax compliance decisions (for an overview see Kirchler, ). For example, Hartner‐Tiefenthaler, Kubicek, Kirchler, Rechberger, and Wenzel () find that tax compliance is positively related to perceptions of distributive justice in the European Union. Numerous studies have investigated the role of personal and social norms on compliance (e.g., Wenzel, ; Wenzel, ; Bobek, Hageman, & Kelliher, 2013).…”