Perceived Legitimacy of Collective Punishment as a Function of Democratic versus Non-Democratic Group Structure

Abstract

The present research tested the hypothesis that the political structure of groups moderates the perceived legitimacy of collective punishment. Participants read scenarios of fictitious summer camps in which unidentified members of one group aggressed members of another group. The political structure of both the offender and the victim groups was described as either egalitarian or hierarchical (defined with democratic or non-democratic decision-making procedures). Perceived legitimacy of collective punishment directed against all members of the offender group was assessed by measuring the acceptability of sanctions administered by an authority and of revenge actions inflicted by members of the victim group. Results showed that collective punishment was evaluated as less legitimate when the offender group was egalitarian and the victim group was hierarchical. Supplementary analyses showed that this effect was mediated by the higher value attributed to members of the offender egalitarian group when the victim group was hierarchical

In the name of democracy: The value of democracy explains leniency towards wrongdoings as a function of group political organization

“…These results indicate that not only does democracy provide legitimacy to wrongful actions such as aggressive and belligerent acts, it also protects democratic offender groups from punishment. Furthermore, this effect was mediated by the offender group's perceived moral value (Falomir‐Pichastor et al, ), supporting the suggestion that democratic groups are more valued than nondemocratic ones and that this value provides legitimacy to their wrongful behaviors.…”

“…Moreover, these effects are in line with the justice motive theory (Lerner, 1977) and the perceptual theory of legitimacy (Crandall & Beasley, 2001) according to which people attempt to establish balanced structures between the characteristics of a situation—such as perpetrators, victims and outcomes—and justice judgments. Hence, the value of democracy may serve as a benchmark in judgments related to democratic and nondemocratic groups: The former should be perceived as upholding the value of democracy, whereas the latter should be seen as violating it (Staerklé, ), and the subsequent judgments should be in line with these perceptions (Falomir‐Pichastor et al, , ). As a result, we should expect retributive judgments following the observation of a wrongdoing to be polarized such that democratic groups should be punished with leniency, while nondemocratic groups should be punished more severely.…”

“…For instance, it has been shown that more lenient judgments towards valued perpetrators are supported as long as it is possible to do so (van Prooijen, , ), and in the case of (non)democratic offending groups, it appears that democratic groups are only inflicted harsher punishments when their collective responsibility is outlined and made clear (Pereira, Berent, Falomir‐Pichastor, Staerklé, & Butera, ). Given that the present research focuses on situations that allow for the minimization of the wrongdoing (following Falomir‐Pichastor et al, , ), we expect the leniency rather than the expectancy‐violation effect to emerge.…”

“…The political organization of the perpetrator group was manipulated in all studies. Following prior research (Falomir‐Pichastor et al, ; ), we chose to focus our conceptualization of democracy on two key procedural features of a democratic organization: free elections of group leaders and the collective deliberative process. The valorization of democracy was measured as an individual difference variable.…”

“…That said, to date, no study has demonstrated the central role of one's personal valorization of democracy per se in these effects. While previous findings showed that democratic offender groups were overall perceived as being endowed with greater moral value (Falomir‐Pichastor et al, ), the present research focuses on the individual‐level antecedents of this positive valence. Thus, we want to demonstrate that when people think highly of a democratic offender group, they do so because they value democracy as a general principle that infuses perceptions and judgments of both democratic and nondemocratic groups.…”