Perceiving mental states: Co-presence and constitution

Abstract

Recently, several philosophers have called attention to the idea that there are occasions on which we can perceive (at least some) mental states of others. In this paper we consider two recent proposals in this direction: the co-presence thesis (Smith, 2010) and the hybrid model (Krueger and Overgaard, 2012). We will examine the aforementioned alternatives and present some objections to both of them. Then, we will propose a way of integrating both accounts which allows us to avoid such objections. Broadly stated, our idea is that by perceiving other people's behaviors we also perceive their mental states because behaviors co-present some features of the latter, and that this perception of others' minds is direct and immediate because behavior is a constitutive part of the mental states in question.Keywords: mindreading, hybrid model, direct perception of other minds, co-presence thesis. RESUMONos últimos tempos, vários filósofos têm defendido a ideia de que, por vezes, podem-se perceber (pelo menos alguns) estados mentais dos outros. Neste artigo, vamos considerar duas propostas neste sentido: a tese da copresença (Smith, 2010) e o modelo híbrido (Krueger e Overgaard, 2012). Vamos examinar as alternativas mencionadas e apresentar algumas objeções contra eles. Então, vamos propor uma maneira de integrar ambas as explicações que nos permite evitar tais acusações. No geral, a nossa ideia é que, quando percebemos o comportamento dos outros nós também percebemos seus estados mentais, porque os estados mentais são coapresentados no comportamento, e que esta percepção das mentes dos outros é direta e imediata, porque o comportamento é parte integrante dos estados mentais em questão.Palavras-chave: leitura mental, modelo híbrido, a percepção direta de outras mentes , tese de copresença.

Mental expression and inner speech

“…3) Finally, it could be argued that Tom's expressive behavior during inner speech is Mary's criterion to detect the falsehood of his report. In fact, mereologists seem well-suited to argue this because they think that it is possible to have direct perceptual access to other people's mental states by perceiving their expressive behavior (Bar-On, 2004;Danón & Kalpokas, 2017;Green, 2007;Krueger, 2012;Krueger & Overgaard, 2012). Similar to how subjects can directly perceive a tree when they perceive one of its branches (outer component), mereologists consider that subjects can directly perceive other people's mental states when they perceive their expressive behavior (outer component).…”

“…so that expressions are related to the other internal non-expressive components of mental states as parts of the same whole or mental state. This view of expression is endorsed, for example, by behaviorism (e.g., Carnap, 1995;Hempel, 1980), 1 and more recently, by some defenders of the idea that it is possible to have direct perceptual access to other people's mental states (e.g., Bar-On, 2004;Danón & Kalpokas, 2017;Green, 2007;Krueger, 2012;Krueger & Overgaard, 2012).…”

Enactive-Dynamic Social Cognition and Active Inference

“…Although social interaction does not reduce prediction, agents know much of each other's behaviour. Much of the meanings unfolding during the construction of the social interaction between enculturated beings is directly grasped in action (e.g., language, social and normative expectations and rituals; Gibson, 2002;Danón and Kalpokas, 2017;Gallagher, 2020).…”