Perceiving properties versus perceiving objects

Millar, Boyd

doi:10.1111/phib.12221

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…In its most extreme version, this view characterizes referential perceptual states as bare demonstratives, which simply pick out objects without attributing properties to them. However, one can simultaneously grant that perceptual states invariably attribute properties and also deny that attribution plays a role in guiding perceptual reference (Millar forthcoming).…”

Section: Three Models Of the Perceptual Reference‐attribution Relationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…More technically, it seems that perceptual representation comprises at least two aspects: reference to perceptible individuals, and attribution of properties to those individuals. The distinction between perceptual reference and perceptual attribution is widely accepted in philosophy (Smith 2002; Clark 2004; Cohen 2004; Burge 2010a; Green 2017; Rescorla 2018; Millar forthcoming; Lande unpublished; cf. Fodor 2007; Schellenberg 2018, 67–68; 2020) and psychology (Treisman & Gelade 1980; Kahneman et al.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Perceptual attribution and perceptual reference

Quilty‐Dunn

Green

2021

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Perceptual representations pick out individuals and attribute properties to them. This paper considers the role of perceptual attribution in determining or guiding perceptual reference to objects. We consider three extant models of the relation between perceptual attribution and perceptual reference--all attribution guides reference, no attribution guides reference, or a privileged subset of attributions guides reference--and argue that empirical evidence undermines all three. We then defend a flexible-attributives model, on which the range of perceptual attributives used to guide reference shifts adaptively with context. This model underscores the remarkable and dynamic intelligence of our perceptual capacities. We elucidate implications of the model for the boundary between perception and propositional thought.

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Section: Three Models Of the Perceptual Reference‐attribution Relationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perceptual attribution and perceptual reference

Quilty‐Dunn

Green

2021

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Seeing through the forms ‐ towards a Platonic indirect realism

de Ray

2024

European J of Philosophy

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Universals in the Platonic tradition were intended to play both metaphysical and epistemological roles. The contemporary debate around universals has focused overwhelmingly on the former, with even ‘platonists’ typically holding that our knowledge of universals is derived from our knowledge of particulars. In contrast, I wish to argue for the epistemological primacy of the universal: specifically, I defend the thesis that we perceive particulars as a result of knowing universals, and not the other way around. My argument draws from the work of Malebranche, who notoriously contended that we see ordinary objects through the immutable ‘ideas’. I conclude with the suggestion that the resulting account of the relationship between our knowledge of universals and our perception of particulars may be thought of as a kind of Platonic indirect realism.

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Perceiving properties versus perceiving objects

Cited by 2 publications

References 49 publications

Perceptual attribution and perceptual reference

Perceptual attribution and perceptual reference

Seeing through the forms ‐ towards a Platonic indirect realism

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