Perceiving tropes

Abstract

There are two very different ways of thinking about perception. According to the first one, perception is representational: it represents the world as being a certain way. According to the second, perception is a genuine relation between the perceiver and a token object. These two views are thought to be incompatible. My aim is to work out the least problematic version of the representational view of perception that preserves the most important considerations in favor of the relational view. According to this version of representationalism, the properties represented in perception are tropes-abstract particulars that are logically incapable of being present in two distinct individuals at the same time. I call this view 'trope representationalism'.

Particularity of Content and Illusions of Identity

“…From the Russellian perspective, the formula R(a) is interpreted as describing the object a as having the property of redness, while from the Fragean perspective the same formula characterizes the object a under the red mode of presentation or as distinguished by applying the concept of redness. Furthermore, I only consider whether particular objects figure in content, and my argumentation does not address the issue of whether perceptually experienced properties are universals or tropes (Almäng 2013;Mulligan 1999;Nanay 2012). In addition, I consider so-called 'self-referential' contents, which include a reference to the experience or the subject itself, as general contents because their particular elements are not objects that are perceived by a subject (Burge 1991;Prat 2006).…”

“…Current debates regarding perceptual content suggest at least two important functions that can be served by such particular elements. First, particular elements may allow for forming singular thoughts relying on perceptual experiences (Brewer 2015;Nanay 2012;Schellenberg 2016). Singular thoughts attribute properties to particular objects, so if they are based on perceptual experiences, the particular part of a "particularized general content" can determine the object that should be a referent of a singular thought.…”

“…First, it is claimed that general content is implausible given the phenomenology of perceptual experiences (Schellenberg 2016;Martin 2002). Second, it has been proposed that general content cannot account for higher-order abilities based on perceptual experiences, such as forming singular thoughts (Brewer 2015;Nanay 2012). Third, it is argued that the general notion of content cannot properly attribute accuracy to certain perceptual experiences, i.e., it entails that some intuitively accurate experiences are inaccurate or vice versa (Dokic 1998;Schroer 2014).…”

Naïve realism about unconscious perception

“…For instance, the naïve realist charge that only naïve realism can explain the particularity of experience faces the intentionalist response that this idea can be incorporated into the framework of perceptual representations (see e.g. Nanay 2012;Schellenberg 2014;Tye 2007). I think that the unconscious perception controversy is similar: while intentionalists argue that positing perceptual representations is indispensable to account for unconscious perception, it is in fact open for naïve realists to respond that their view has the resources necessary to explain this phenomenon.…”

“…For example, it has been argued that the propositional content of perception contains an indexical term which picks some particular object (Tye 2014), or that the properties perceptual content represents the perceived object as having are tropes, i.e. abstract particulars (Nanay 2012). For Campbell, however, this is not sufficient to accredit demonstrative judgment to perceptual consciousness because under intentionalism experience with the same phenomenal character as perception can occur when the represented object is not present (Campbell 2002, p. 117).…”