Perception and Basic Beliefs

Lyons, Jack

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195373578.001.0001

Cited by 161 publications

(40 citation statements)

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“…Experiences play well the roles that characterize evidence (2013: 17). And later: 8 For defenses of the statist view, see Brueckner (2009), Cohen (1984, Conee and Feldman (2008), Dougherty and Rysiew (2013), Gibbons (2010), Haack (2009), Lyons (2009), McCain (2014, Mitova (forthcoming), and Turri (2009). For defenses of propositionalism, see Dougherty (2011), Fantl and McGrath (2009), Miller (2008, and Schroeder (2008Schroeder ( , 2011.…”

Section: Internalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

How and Why Knowledge is First

Littlejohn¹

2017

Oxford Scholarship Online

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This chapter’s dialectical aim has, as its focus, a sustained defence of the claim that one cannot have a reason in one’s possession unless it is something that one knows. This view is claimed to have advantages over a different way of thinking about epistemic status. On the ‘reasons-first’ approach to epistemic status, reasons and the possession of them are prior to epistemic status. In reversing this picture, the chapter reveals an important sense in which knowledge comes first—namely, in that we first come to have reasons in our possession by coming to know that certain things are true; there is nothing prior to knowledge that puts these reasons in our possession. In the course of advancing this picture, the chapter furthermore offers a defence of Williamson’s identification of evidence and knowledge (E=K).

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Section: Internalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

How and Why Knowledge is First

Littlejohn¹

2017

Oxford Scholarship Online

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“…Answering this will require answering why Norman's belief is unjustified. There is significant philosophical literature that attempts to pinpoint exactly which important necessary condition on justification Norman is missing: e.g., a correct etiology (Lyons, , p. 119), proper function (Bergmann, , p. 141; Graham ; Graham ), externalist reliabilist evidence (Comesaña, , p. 582), and integration with the believer's cognitive character (Breyer and Greco, , p. 175). Harmen Ghijsen (, pp.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…See also Lyons’ (, p. 119) case of Nyrmoon, an alien who lives in a species where it is normal to have clairvoyance powers.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

How to Use Cognitive Faculties You Never Knew You Had

Moon

2018

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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Norman forms the belief that the president is in New York by way of a clairvoyance faculty he doesn’t know he has. Many agree that his belief is unjustified but disagree about why it is unjustified. I argue that the lack of justification cannot be explained by a higher‐level evidence requirement on justification, but it can be explained by a no‐defeater requirement. I then explain how you can use cognitive faculties you don’t know you have. Lastly, I use lessons from the foregoing to compare Norman's belief, formed by clairvoyance, with Sally's theistic belief, formed by a sensus divinitatis.

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“…To say that experiences justify beliefs is not yet to say that they provide justification in virtue of their phenomenal character. They might instead provide justification solely in virtue of further properties which can be had in the absence of phenomenology (see Lyons 2009 andarguably Burge 2003).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%