Perception and its Objects

Brewer, Bill

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199260256.001.0001

Cited by 306 publications

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“…Since my experience puts me in a position to know noninferentially that what I see is a cardinal, its content would have to include a proposition in which the concept 17 I cannot hope to give a defense of this idea here. For defenses of this idea, see Brewer (2011), Logue (this volume), Martin (2009), and Travis (2011. Ginsborg (2011), Logue (2014), McDowell (2009), and Schellenberg (2014 all defend reconciliatory views that are supposed to reconcile representational and relational views of perception.…”

Section: 1mentioning

confidence: 99%

How and Why Knowledge is First

Littlejohn¹

2017

Oxford Scholarship Online

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This chapter’s dialectical aim has, as its focus, a sustained defence of the claim that one cannot have a reason in one’s possession unless it is something that one knows. This view is claimed to have advantages over a different way of thinking about epistemic status. On the ‘reasons-first’ approach to epistemic status, reasons and the possession of them are prior to epistemic status. In reversing this picture, the chapter reveals an important sense in which knowledge comes first—namely, in that we first come to have reasons in our possession by coming to know that certain things are true; there is nothing prior to knowledge that puts these reasons in our possession. In the course of advancing this picture, the chapter furthermore offers a defence of Williamson’s identification of evidence and knowledge (E=K).

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Section: 1mentioning

confidence: 99%

How and Why Knowledge is First

Littlejohn¹

2017

Oxford Scholarship Online

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“…Mehta cites the following: Brewer (2011), Campbell (2002, Fish (2009), Martin (2004) and (2006. We will follow the standard nomenclature in the philosophy of perception literature and refer to these authors as naïve realists.…”

Section: Phenomenal Particularismmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the particularity of experience

Gomes¹,

French

2015

Philos Stud

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Forthcoming, Philosophical Studies [accepted 2015]Phenomenal particularism is the view that particular external objects are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. It is a central part of naïve realist or relational views of perception. We consider a series of recent objections to phenomenal particularism and argue that naïve realism has the resources to block them. In particular, we show that these objections rest on assumptions about the nature of phenomenal character that the naïve realist will reject, and that they ignore the full resources that naïve realism has to offer in explaining phenomenal character.

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“…For example, an immediate and obvious objection is that surely we can and do make sense of claims to the effect that things that are rectangular look square. At the very least, it is plausible that the relational theory will need modification to allow for such cases, for example by thinking of perception as a three-place relation between subject, object and physical point of view (see for example , Campbell 2005;Brewer 2011). Note too, that as I have formulated it, the relational theory does not exclude the claim that experiences also have representational contents.…”

Section: Presentation (Or Acquaintance) Is a Two-term Relation Of A Smentioning

confidence: 99%

“…What it insists on denying, for our purposes, is, first, that the relation between the experience and the object perceived is causal; and, second, that we need to appeal to personal-level representational mediation to explain how basic observational properties of mindindependent objects 'make it into' the phenomenal character of our experiences. There is a view of perceptual experiences on which they are conceived of as states, the contents of which should be specified by appeal to world-dependent senses (see, e.g., McDowell 1996;Brewer 1999). Such views would endorse the first, anti-causal claim, but reject the second.…”

Section: Presentation (Or Acquaintance) Is a Two-term Relation Of A Smentioning

confidence: 99%

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Perceptual Objectivity and Consciousness: A Relational Response to Burge’s Challenge

Eilan

2015

Topoi

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My question is: does phenomenal consciousness have a critical role in explaining the way conscious perceptions achieve objective import? I approach it through developing a dilemma I label 'Burge's Challenge', which is implicit in his approach to perceptual objectivity. It says, crudely: either endorse the general structure of his account of how objective perceptual import is achieved (an account I label 'Caused Representation'), and give up on a role for consciousness. Or, relinquish Caused Representation, and possibly defend a role for consciousness. Someone I call Burge* holds we should embrace the first horn of the dilemma. A second response, roughly the relationalist approach, opts for the second horn. The third option, implicit in many current approaches to perceptual consciousness, is to reject the dilemma. The paper argues for a version of the second response. The key argument turns on the development of a sceptical challenge to justify the assumption that we perceive particular intrinsic property instantiations, rather than their structural equivalents. The suggestion will be that only the relationalist approach can meet it in the way we think it is met. If this is right, there is a prima facie case for taking relationalist responses to the dilemma seriously. I end with two objections to this response, which might be made by the real Burge in defence of opting for the first horn of the dilemma, and by phenomenal intentionalists in defence of rejecting the dilemma. I use discussion of these to highlight one of the main issues that should be pursued in order to make good the claim that we should embrace the horn of the dilemma that Burge* rejects.

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Perception and its Objects

Cited by 306 publications

References 0 publications

How and Why Knowledge is First

How and Why Knowledge is First

On the particularity of experience

Perceptual Objectivity and Consciousness: A Relational Response to Burge’s Challenge

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