Perception and Ordinary Objects

Byrne, Alex

doi:10.1017/9781316612897.002

The Nature of Ordinary Objects 2019

DOI: 10.1017/9781316612897.002

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Perception and Ordinary Objects

Alex Byrne¹

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2021

2024

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Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 203 publications

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“… Examples include Harman 1990; McDowell 1994, 191;Dretske 1995; Martin 1998, 174;Byrne 2001; Campbell 2002, 116; Fish 2009, 5-16;Pautz 2013;Logue 2014;Speaks 2015; Schellenberg 2018, chap. 6. Notable dissents includeBlock 2003 andPeacocke 1983. …”

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confidence: 99%

Hallucination and Its Objects

Byrne

Manzotti

2022

The Philosophical Review

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When one visually hallucinates, the object of one’s hallucination is not before one’s eyes. On the standard view, that is because the object of hallucination does not exist, and so is not anywhere. Many different defenses of the standard view are on offer; each has problems. This article defends the view that there is always an object of hallucination—a physical object, sometimes with spatiotemporally scattered parts.

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confidence: 99%

Hallucination and Its Objects

Byrne

Manzotti

2022

The Philosophical Review

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What are empirical consequences? On dispensability and composite objects

LeBrun

2021

Synthese

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Philosophers sometimes give arguments that presuppose the following principle: two theories can fail to be empirically equivalent on the sole basis that they present different “thick” metaphysical pictures of the world. Recently, a version of this principle has been invoked to respond to the argument that composite objects are dispensable to our best scientific theories. This response claims that our empirical evidence distinguishes between ordinary and composite-free theories, and it empirically favors the ordinary ones (Hofweber 2016, 2018). In this paper, I ask whether this response to the dispensability argument is tenable. I claim that it is not. This is because it presupposes an indefensible thesis about when two empirical consequences are distinct or the same. My argument provides some insight into what our empirical consequences are, and I conclude that empirical evidence is radically metaphysically neutral. This gives us some insight into the significant content of our scientific theories—the content that a scientific realist is committed to—and I show how this insight relates to questions about theoretical equivalence more broadly.

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Perceptual metaphysics: the case for composites

Ivanov,

Schipper

2024

Philosophical Explorations

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Perception and Ordinary Objects

Cited by 4 publications

References 203 publications

Hallucination and Its Objects

Hallucination and Its Objects

What are empirical consequences? On dispensability and composite objects

Perceptual metaphysics: the case for composites

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