Perception, Connectionism, and Cognitive Science

Skarda, Christine A.

doi:10.1007/978-94-015-8054-0_14

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 8 publications

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“…While the notion of representation is widely used in cognitivist neuroscience, it is not endorsed across the board in neuroscience. Skarda (2013 , p. 265) notes that ‘recent findings in neurophysiology and cognitive science point to the conclusion that cognition can be explained without appeal to the representations and rules of earlier cognitivist explanations’. This claim is motivated by 30 years of research together with Freeman (2001) .…”

Section: What Might Cognition Be If Not Neural Representation?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Cognition Without Neural Representation: Dynamics of a Complex System

Hipólito

2022

Front. Psychol.

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This paper proposes an account of neurocognitive activity without leveraging the notion of neural representation. Neural representation is a concept that results from assuming that the properties of the models used in computational cognitive neuroscience (e.g., information, representation, etc.) must literally exist the system being modelled (e.g., the brain). Computational models are important tools to test a theory about how the collected data (e.g., behavioural or neuroimaging) has been generated. While the usefulness of computational models is unquestionable, it does not follow that neurocognitive activity should literally entail the properties construed in the model (e.g., information, representation). While this is an assumption present in computationalist accounts, it is not held across the board in neuroscience. In the last section, the paper offers a dynamical account of neurocognitive activity with Dynamical Causal Modelling (DCM) that combines dynamical systems theory (DST) mathematical formalisms with the theoretical contextualisation provided by Embodied and Enactive Cognitive Science (EECS).

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Section: What Might Cognition Be If Not Neural Representation?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Cognition Without Neural Representation: Dynamics of a Complex System

Hipólito

2022

Front. Psychol.

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Social Origins of Cognition: Bartlett, Evolutionary Perspective and Embodied Mind Approach

Saito

1996

J Theory Soc Behav

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This paper explores new avenues of research on social bases of cognition and a more adequate (than those extant) framework to conceive the phenomena of the human mind. It firstly examines Bartlett's work on social bases of cognition, from which three pertinent features are identified, namely multi‐level analyses, evolutionary perspective and embodied mind approach. It then examines recent works on social origins of cognition in ethology and paleoanthropology, and various forms of the embodied mind approach recently proposed in neuroscience and cognitive science. The paper concludes that extending the embodied mind approach would provide the most potent framework to enable, amongst others, the conceptual integration of the biological, psychological and social bases of the human mind, which have in the past been treated mainly as competing alternatives.

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Perception, Connectionism, and Cognitive Science

Cited by 2 publications

References 8 publications

Cognition Without Neural Representation: Dynamics of a Complex System

Cognition Without Neural Representation: Dynamics of a Complex System

Social Origins of Cognition: Bartlett, Evolutionary Perspective and Embodied Mind Approach

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