Perceptions of Prolonged Occupation as Barriers to Conflict Resolution

Abstract

The goal of this research was to examine whether a denial of a prolonged occupation by the occupying society constitutes a meaningful sociopsychological barrier to resolving the conflict peacefully. We hypothesized that this perception will be associated with objections both to conflict resolution processes and to specific compromises intended to end the occupation. Furthermore, we hypothesized that the association between denial of the occupation and compromises will be partially mediated by denial of its costs, low levels of moral emotions, and closure to new information about the conflict. Taking the prolonged Israeli occupation as our case study, we used three nationwide representative polls of Jewish Israelis to test our hypotheses. The studies supported our hypotheses, pointing to the distinct role that the perception of prolonged occupation by the occupying society plays in peacefully ending this situation, and the psychological mechanisms underlying occupation denial as a barrier to conflict resolution.

Support for Conciliatory Policies in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Role of Different Modes of Identification and Territorial Ownership Perceptions

“…Research on these ownership perceptions is still in its infancy. One study has addressed the role of ingroup ownership perceptions in reconciliation intentions ( Storz et al, 2020 ), and one other study has addressed the role of outgroup ownership perceptions only and did so using proxy measures ( Rosler et al, 2018 ). Ours it the first study to consider both of these perceptions in tandem.…”

“…Further, in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and from the perspective of Israeli Jews, ingroup superiority, but not attachment, was related to higher exonerating cognitions (minimizing ingroup wrongdoings), and to lower perceptions of group-based guilt ( Roccas et al, 2006 ). Acknowledgment of ingroup wrongdoings, as well as group-based guilt were found to be positively related among Israeli Jews to support for conciliatory measures in their conflict with the Palestinians ( Čehajić-Clancy et al, 2011 ; Halperin et al, 2014 ; Rosler et al, 2018 ), and thus conciliatory policies might be a next step in conflict resolution processes. Finally, among Serbs, stronger ingroup superiority was related to lower willingness to reconcile with Bosniaks, but ingroup attachment did not relate to reconciliation intentions ( Li et al, 2018 ).…”

“…Similarly, there is support for the idea that outgroup ownership perceptions relate to conciliatory policies among Israeli Jews. Higher perception of outgroup (Palestinian) ownership of the West Bank—assessed indirectly as “acknowledging occupation of the territory” by the ingroup (Israeli Jews)—was associated with more support for a compromise in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as return to the 1967 borders and division of Jerusalem ( Rosler et al, 2018 ). Thus, we hypothesize that stronger outgroup ownership perceptions are associated with more support for conciliatory policies (H6).…”

“…The partition was endorsed by the Jewish community who proclaimed its independent state in 1948, and rejected by the Palestinians and Arab countries ( Tessler, 2009 ). In 1949, the territory of the State of Israel was determined along armistice lines, which have since been disputed, and increasingly so after Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during the 1967 war ( Rosler et al, 2018 ). Currently, the land dispute is mainly about the question where the borders of Israel should be, rather than about the question of existence of Israel ( Waxman, 2019 ).…”

Current and Future Costs of Intractable Conflicts—Can They Create Attitude Change?

“…Finally, the third pillar is narratives about patriotism, with its glorified ultimate symbol of devotion and willingness to sacrifice for the collective during the conflict (Eidelson and Eidelson, 2003;Hadjipavlou, 2007;Papadakis, 2008;Hammack, 2009;Garagozov, 2012;Bar-Tal, 2013). Due to their great functionality in dealing with the challenges of the conflict and, more specifically, its severe costs, conflict narratives often become hegemonic, widely shared by society members and deeply entrenched (Maoz and McCauley, 2008;Halperin and Bar-Tal, 2011;Vollhardt and Bilali, 2015;Rosler et al, 2018). However, they also feed the continuation of the conflict by providing rationale for the cycles of violence and their costs and block the flow of crucial information for resolving the conflict peacefully and the openness of society members to such information (Halperin and Bar-Tal, 2011).…”