Perceptual Content Defended

Schellenberg, Susanna

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2332043

Cited by 40 publications

(93 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…I think this is incorrect. My view on this matter isn t novel some have argued that there is a relatively weak interpretation of the claim that experience has content that Naïve Realists can and should accept (see Siegel 2010 andSchellenberg 2011 But ) differ with previous compatibilists on two issues. First, pace Siegel and Schellenberg, I think there is an argument for the claim that experience has content in the weak sense that is more effective than the ones hitherto offered.…”

Section: Experiential Content and Naïve Realism: A Reconciliationmentioning

confidence: 93%

Experiential Content and Naïve Realism

Logue¹

2014

Does Perception Have Content?

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Section: Experiential Content and Naïve Realism: A Reconciliationmentioning

confidence: 93%

Experiential Content and Naïve Realism

Logue¹

2014

Does Perception Have Content?

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“…If my perceptual state has singular content, then there must be a specific object that the 4 See especially Campbell (2002), Brewer (2006), and Travis (2004. 5 See McDowell (1986), Brewer (1999), Campbell (2002), Fish (2009), Schellenberg (2011), Tye (2007 and Travis (Forthcoming). 6 See Brewer (1999), Campbell (2002, Evans (1982) and McDowell (1996).…”

Section: The Predicamentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Please mind the gappy content

Gersel

2017

Philos Stud

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Representationalist theories of experience face the problem that two sets of compelling intuitions seem to support the contrary conclusions that we should ascribe, respectively, singular contents and general contents to experience. Susanna Schellenberg has, in a series of articles, argued that we can conserve both sets of intuitions if we award a central explanatory role to the notions of gappy-contents and content-schemas in our theory of experience. I argue that there is difficulty in seeing how gappy-contents and content-schemas can fulfil the explanatory role envisioned for them by Schellenberg. The central problem is that both gappycontents and contentschemas lack truth-conditions. Schellenberg attempts to support her view by suggesting an analogy between the role of content-schemas in our account of experience and the role of Kaplan's notion of character in our account of demonstrative statements. However, I show that this analogy breaks down at crucial places when it is explored in detail. Hence, gappy-contents and content-schemas cannot fill the explanatory roles that the representationalist awards to fully truthevaluable contents. Therefore, Schellenberg's theory provides no way for the representationalist to conserve both sets of competing intuitions.

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“…Although Martin's account is not the only negative account of perceptual error in the literature, other available strategies are not promising either. 32 Given the above discussion, it should be clear that perceptual error is a serious challenge for the naïve realist. Nevertheless, let's consider another relatively recent defense of a cognitive account of error which could be regarded as a more plausible interpretation of Travis' proposal.…”

Section: Naïve Realism and Perceptual Errormentioning

confidence: 99%