Perceptual Organization and Consciousness

Schwarzkopf, D. Samuel; Rees, Geraint

doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199686858.013.042

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 134 publications

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“…But even a non-conscious system like an automaton can relate to something external to it. Not even the ability to select one region of the field as the object rather than another ( Schwarzkopf and Rees, 2015 ) guarantees the occurrence of conscious experience. Therefore, there are aspects that do belong to consciousness, but not in a specific way.…”

Section: The Problem Of the Specificity Of Consciousnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Approaching the nature of consciousness through a phenomenal analysis of early vision. What is the explanandum?

Forti

2024

Front. Psychol.

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Loorits (2014) identifies the solution to the hard problem of consciousness in the possibility of fully analyzing seemingly non-structural aspects of consciousness in structural terms. However, research on consciousness conducted in recent decades has failed to bridge the explanatory gap between the brain and conscious mind. One reason why the explanatory gap cannot be filled, and consequently the problem remains hard, is that experience and neural structure are too different or “distant” to be directly compatible. Conversely, structural aspects of consciousness can be found in phenomenal experience. One possible alternative, therefore, is to seek the structure of seemingly non-structural aspects of consciousness not in the neural substrate, but within consciousness itself, through a phenomenal analysis of the qualitative aspects of experience, starting from its simplest forms. An essential premise is to reformulate the explanandum of consciousness, which is usually attributed to qualia and what it is like to be in a certain state. However, these properties do not allow us to identify the fundamental aspects of phenomenal experience. Sensations such as the redness of red or the painfulness of pain are inseparable from the context of the experience to which they belong, making qualia appear as phenomenal artifacts. Furthermore, the simplest qualitative aspects can be found in early vision. They are involved in perceptual organization and necessarily have relational significance. The unitary set of qualities found in early vision—such as those related to being an object, background or detail—constitutes the explanandum of the simplest forms of consciousness and seems to imply a justifying structure. Although early vision is characterized by interdependent qualitative components that form a unitary whole, we cannot find in it the structure of seemingly non-structural aspects of consciousness. Phenomenal appearance alone does not seem sufficient to identify a unitary structure of consciousness. However, the closeness of these characteristics to a unitary structure prompts us to delve into less explored territory, using the components of experience also as possible explanans.

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Section: The Problem Of the Specificity Of Consciousnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Approaching the nature of consciousness through a phenomenal analysis of early vision. What is the explanandum?

Forti

2024

Front. Psychol.

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“…However, all these studies do not seem to be able to bridge the explanatory gap (Levine, 1983) between physical phenomena and phenomenal experience (Marius, 2014;Skokowski, 2022;Jones and Hunt, 2023;Sanfey, 2023). Many theories have addressed non-specific aspects of consciousness, such as access-consciousness (Block, 1995(Block, , 2005Baars, 2002;Tyler, 2020), meta-representation (Gennaro, 2004;Brown et al, 2019), global access (Dehaene et al, 1998;Dehaene, 2014), unity (Bayne, 2010), integration, (Tononi, 2008;Tononi and Koch, 2015;Brogaard et al, 2021;Hirschhorn et al, 2021), intentionality (Crane, 2003(Crane, , 2009, selection (Zeman, 2001;Schwarzkopf and Rees, 2015). In the absence of specific features of consciousness, there is a risk of formulating a theory that refers to something that is compatible with the absence of consciousness.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The hidden structure of consciousness

Forti

2024

Front. Psychol.

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According to Loorits, if we want consciousness to be explained in terms of natural sciences, we should be able to analyze its seemingly non-structural aspects, like qualia, in structural terms. However, the studies conducted over the last three decades do not seem to be able to bridge the explanatory gap between physical phenomena and phenomenal experience. One possible way to bridge the explanatory gap is to seek the structure of consciousness within consciousness itself, through a phenomenal analysis of the qualitative aspects of experience. First, this analysis leads us to identify the explanandum concerning the simplest forms of experience not in qualia but in the unitary set of qualities found in early vision. Second, it leads us to hypothesize that consciousness is also made up of non-apparent parts, and that there exists a hidden structure of consciousness. This structure, corresponding to a simple early visual experience, is constituted by a Hierarchy of Spatial Belongings nested within each other. Each individual Spatial Belonging is formed by a primary content and a primary space. The primary content can be traced in the perceptibility of the contents we can distinguish in the phenomenal field. The primary space is responsible for the perceptibility of the content and is not perceptible in itself. However, the phenomenon I refer to as subtraction of visibility allows us to characterize it as phenomenally negative. The hierarchical relationships between Spatial Belongings can ensure the qualitative nature of components of perceptual organization, such as object, background, and detail. The hidden structure of consciousness presents aspects that are decidedly counterintuitive compared to our idea of phenomenal experience. However, on the one hand, the Hierarchy of Spatial Belongings can explain the qualities of early vision and their appearance as a unitary whole, while on the other hand, it might be more easily explicable in terms of brain organization. In other words, the hidden structure of consciousness can be considered a bridge structure which, placing itself at an intermediate level between experience and physical properties, can contribute to bridging the explanatory gap.

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Perceptual Organization and Consciousness

Cited by 2 publications

References 134 publications

Approaching the nature of consciousness through a phenomenal analysis of early vision. What is the explanandum?

Approaching the nature of consciousness through a phenomenal analysis of early vision. What is the explanandum?

The hidden structure of consciousness

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