Perceptualism and the epistemology of normative reasons

Abstract

According to much recent work in metaethics, we have a perceptual access to normative properties and relations. On a common approach, this access has a presentational character. Here, ‘presentational’ specifies a characteristic feature of the way aspects of the environment are apprehended in sensory experience. While many authors have argued that we enjoy presentations of value properties, thus far comparatively less effort has been invested into developing a presentational view of the apprehension of normative reasons. Since it appears that this view would offer much the same theoretical benefits as presentational views of the apprehension of value, it seems worthwhile redressing this imbalance. My paper aims at doing so, focusing on concern-dependent practical reasons. After clarifying the central commitment of this view, I assess a recent proposal by Dancy (Ethics 124(4):787-812, 2014) which provides a detailed characterization of the relevant type of cognition. I argue that Dancy ignores one of the central features of a presentational access to normative reasons and therefore misidentifies which actual psychological phenomena are apt to play this role. In this context, I also assess and reject further candidates that might seem fitting for this purpose. In the remainder of the paper, I then offer a more adequate account which specifies an actual form of presentational access to concern-dependent practical reasons and provide the contours of a more substantive account of its nature.

The spontaneity of emotion

“…Merleau‐Ponty (1962) and, for discussion, Dreyfus (2005), Dreyfus and Kelly (2007), among others. In contrast to Dreyfus (2005), I believe there are strong grounds to suppose that by automatically giving to the solicitation to back away from a close talker or return a handshake one can be responding to a normative reason. I support this claim in Müller (2020). While I lack the space to defend it here, below, I offer further examples of non‐voluntary compliance which should be less controversial in this respect as they concern doxastic attitudes.…”

“…for example, von Hildebrand (1969, pt. I, Chapter 1), McDowell (1996), Chudnoff (2012), Bengson (2015), Müller (2020).…”

Armchair Evaluative Knowledge and Sentimental Perceptualism

“…An easy way to see how the armchair challenge arises is to notice an apparent asymmetry between evaluative and empirical inquiry. 9 Although we can think about empirical questions from the armchair (e.g., what would happen if I pushed my laptop off the table ?) and such reflection can help us to gain knowledge, such armchair inquiry is typically understood as epistemically subordinate to non-armchair investigation. In other words, the ultimate arbiter for empirical questions is (literal) perception, what we observe in the world.…”

“…For contemporary proponents, see, among others, Mark Johnston [5], Graham Oddie [6], Robert Roberts [7], and Christine Tappolet [8]. Notably, some theorists prefer to think of desires and emotions as responses to perceptual-like feelings of value rather than as perceptual-like themselves [9,10]. Theorists drawn to this model should feel free to translate my arguments accordingly.…”

How Naive Is Contentful Moral Perception?

“…To hone in on a moral perceptual case, consider Harman's classic case of seeing some children pouring gasoline on a cat and lighting it on fire [31] Intuitively, the decent person's immediate and nondeliberative reaction to such a scene is to try to step in to save the cat. As Jean Moritz Müller says, "It is a familiar part of ordinary experience that our perceptible surroundings demand action from us [32], p. 3572."…”