2014
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2530876
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Performance Incentives and Economic Growth: Regional Officials in Russia and China

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Cited by 17 publications
(21 citation statements)
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“…The resulting regional competition between state-business alliances works as a corrective against corruption (May et al, 2018). By contrast, the most important promotion criterion for Russian regional officials is political loyalty in the form of election outcomes for the ruling party (Rochlitz, Kulpina, Remington, & Yakovlev, 2015). The highly centralised tax system in Russia (only a small percentage of taxes collected locally remain in the region) may be a further disincentive for Russian governors to show initiative in the economic affairs of their region, and does not prevent rent-seeking and corruption.…”
Section: The Ambiguous Role Of Patrimonialism: Market Enhancing or Mamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The resulting regional competition between state-business alliances works as a corrective against corruption (May et al, 2018). By contrast, the most important promotion criterion for Russian regional officials is political loyalty in the form of election outcomes for the ruling party (Rochlitz, Kulpina, Remington, & Yakovlev, 2015). The highly centralised tax system in Russia (only a small percentage of taxes collected locally remain in the region) may be a further disincentive for Russian governors to show initiative in the economic affairs of their region, and does not prevent rent-seeking and corruption.…”
Section: The Ambiguous Role Of Patrimonialism: Market Enhancing or Mamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, this way of improving institutions also requires major changes in policy. Thus, an important prerequisite here is the extra degrees of freedom for sub-federal authorities and the formation of their incentives to support the development of the economy, which obviously are insufficient at present (Rochlitz et al, 2015).…”
Section: An Outline Of the New Economic Programmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Following the supposed "chaos" of the 1990s, Russia's government has emphasized control. Bottom-up initiatives are viewed with skepticism, regions are rewarded on the basis of political loyalty rather than being given incentives to foster initiative, and civil society groups receive funding based on political criteria rather than creative contributions (Balzer 2008;Rochlitz et al 2015). The incentive structure encourages local officials to be predatory more often than developmental.…”
Section: The Triple Helix Model In Transition Economiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Russian policies overwhelmingly encourage short time horizons and behavior that satisfies leaders in Moscow. China's leaders certainly do not encourage policies that contradict their views, but they have been far more pragmatic in accepting deviations that produce positive economic results (Rochlitz et al 2015;Zweig 2002;Florini et al 2012;Vogel 1989;Zhou 1996). The incentive structure in China, particularly in the 1980s and early 1990s, but also more recently rewards local officials for improving the local economy, at least statistically.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%