Performance Management in the Government of the People's Republic of China

Burns, John P.; Zhou, Zhiren

doi:10.1787/budget-10-5km7h1rvtlnq

Cited by 58 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…Political campaigns such as Sweep Away Black secure local compliance through the oversight and management of local officials charged with their enforcement (Burns & Zhou, 2010), but the campaign offered an additional incentive to cash-strapped local governments in the contribution to their coffers of confiscated properties and assets. Borrowing again from the Chongqing playbook, convicted crooks and their protective umbrellas could be subject to large fines as well as the confiscation of their cash, cars, businesses and property, with the proceeds flowing into local government coffers.…”

Section: Sweep Away Black: Results and Responsementioning

confidence: 99%

Political and Social Control in China: The Consolidation of Single-Party Rule

2024

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The editors would also like to thank several individuals for their assistance. Yi-Horng Chiang and Yu-Wei Hu provided outstanding logistical support for the conference and organised student volunteers from National Chengchi University. In addition, Megan Wu and Cathryn Game provided vital administrative and editorial support (respectively) during the editorial process. We also owe our appreciation to the two anonymous reviewers of the manuscript for their invaluable suggestions to improve the quality of the final version. Last but not least, we would like to thank our authors for their valuable contributions to this project.

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Section: Sweep Away Black: Results and Responsementioning

confidence: 99%

Political and Social Control in China: The Consolidation of Single-Party Rule

2024

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“…With the further marketization of energy prices, we expect that energy price changes can have a mitigating effect on energy demand in the long term. Although the Chinese central government has planned to gradually cancel the GDP-based performance evaluation system of local governors during the past two decades (Burns and Zhou, 2010), rapid economic growth is still the prime interest of many local governors. One of the underlying reasons is that the GDP-based targets can benefit local governors' career promotions since the GDP-based targets can be achieved in a relatively short period in comparison with other targets, such as ecological sustainability.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Urban Residential Energy Demand and Rebound Effect in China: A Stochastic Energy Demand Frontier Approach

Du¹,

Shao²,

Yan³

2021

The Energy Journal

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The energy rebound effect is a potential threat to energy-saving targets based on energy efficiency improvements. This paper employs a stochastic energy demand frontier model to analyze the energy demand and rebound effect in China's urban residential sector. Using a panel data set of 30 Chinese provincial-level regions over the period 2001-2014, for the first time, we investigate the degrees and determinants of China's urban residential energy demand and energy rebound effect. The results show that residents' income level, energy price, temperature deviation, population scale, household size, and district heating system are significant influencing factors of residential energy consumption. Regarding the energy rebound effect, we find that energy price is negatively correlated with the rebound effect, and an inverted U-shaped relationship between residents' income level and rebound-effect size exists. The magnitude of the rebound effect varies across regions, with an average of 65.4%. The main policy implication generated by this study is that it should be in urgent need of energy pricing reform to mitigate the rebound effect in China.

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“…If a major central policy entails the assistance of the procuratorial system, it is listed as a major anticorruption area and key target in the work assignment 3 . Local procuratorial officials are evaluated according to their fulfillment of detailed work targets under the cadre responsibility system (Burns & Zhou, 2010; Edin, 2003). According to our interviews, procuratorial departments and officials are ranked through annual appraisals according to various indicators, including the number of corruption cases investigated, and good performance is rewarded with career opportunities and monetary bonuses.…”

Section: Policy Coordination and Allocation Of Anticorruption Attenti...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Policy coordination and selective corruption control in China

Zhan

Zhu

2022

Policy Studies Journal

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In autocracies facing widespread corruption, the allocation of the scant attention available for fighting corruption strongly affects corruption control. Although research has found that authoritarian regimes tend to fight corruption selectively, it is unknown whether and how autocracies allocate attention across different policy areas to combat corruption. We propose that single‐party authoritarian regimes can steer anticorruption attention to the policy domains prioritized by the central authority through the mechanism of cross‐organizational policy coordination. Using original datasets compiled from Chinese governmental and procuratorial policy papers from 1998 to 2016, we demonstrate that Chinese prosecutors direct anticorruption attention to the policy domains accentuated in the central government's major reforms. Our field interviews support this finding and reveal possible disruption of anticorruption efforts in policy domains falling off the central government's top list. Thus, we extend the research on political influence over anticorruption agencies and show that single‐party regimes can instrumentalize anticorruption to serve the government's policy agenda, driving the allocation of limited anticorruption attention across policy areas.

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Performance Management in the Government of the People's Republic of China

Cited by 58 publications

References 4 publications

Political and Social Control in China: The Consolidation of Single-Party Rule

Political and Social Control in China: The Consolidation of Single-Party Rule

Urban Residential Energy Demand and Rebound Effect in China: A Stochastic Energy Demand Frontier Approach

Policy coordination and selective corruption control in China

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