Performing accountability in petroleum resource governance in a shrinking democratic space: The case of Tanzania

A difficult journey from enactment to implementation of local content policy: instigating factors and accountability mechanisms for achieving sustainable development

“…The outcome is a stronger assumption of normative and cognitive institutional legitimacy bending in Ghana than in similar sub-Saharan rising countries (e.g. Ablo, 2015;Sørreime and Tronvoll, 2020). Mixed reactions suggest there is still a long way to go before reaching performance targets equal to resource-rich developed countries.…”

CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE PARADOXES OF STATE CAPITALISM: Ethnographies of Norwegian Energy and Extraction Businesses Abroad

“…One reason is that corporations within the extractive sector have enormous up-front capital costs and are therefore quite concerned with risk. MNCs face risk from national governments, which may withdraw concessions in case of noncompliance or may change regulatory frameworks, including nationalization of the resources (Lange and Kinyondo 2016;Sørreime and Tronvoll 2020;Wilson 2015;and chapter 6 in this volume). MNCs also face risk from local communities in the form of social unrest Davis and Franks 2014: 32;Shapiro, Hobdari, and Oh 2018), and many are open about the fact that CSR is, fi rst of all, a question of risk management and ge ing a social license to operate (Kirsch 2016;Wanvik 2016: 524).…”

Infrastructure Nationalism and Political Vulnerability – Examining the Stalled Negotiations Over the Bagamoyo Port Project During Magufuli’s Reign

“…The Kikwete government was not done with the oil industry. The following year, it voted through the Petroleum Law, emphasising the requirement for local content in developing petroleum resources (Sørreime and Tronvoll, 2020: 1494).…”

“…Other irregularities involved an Internet shutdown on election day on top of pre-ticketed ballots (Collard, 2021: 11). Freedom of speech and democratic checks-and-balances were railroaded with opposition MPs, independent journalists, researchers and civil society representatives routinely silenced under Magufuli’s watch, while live broadcasts of parliamentary debates were prohibited (Sørreime and Tronvoll, 2020: 1492). Communication channels between opposition parties and its supporters virtually suffocated – a process which Magufuli had been intent on completing during his first term following his suggestion to ‘[.…”

“…This article therefore asks: to what extent was Magufuli’s ‘infrastructure nationalism’ (combining elements of state developmentalism, heightened nationalism and authoritarianism) responsible for the collapse of the renegotiations over the BPP’s FA between the Tanzanian state, CMHI and SGRF? This article posits that for as much as the collapse in talks between Tanzania with CMHI/SGRF was down to Magufuli’s ‘infrastructure nationalism’, what this ultimately revealed was Magufuli’s unending need to score political points in order to secure his position in the party and with the popular vote (Nkobou and Ainslie, 2021: 379; Sørreime and Tronvoll, 2020: 1493). In other words, this article will assess the extent to which Magufuli’s cravings for public relations (PR) opportunism triggered by his political vulnerability and weak powerbase as a relative outsider (compared with Lowassa), who arrived at the helm at a time when CCM was facing electoral uncertainty, is what drove him to repeatedly disrupt negotiations over the BPP (Collard, 2021: 13; Poncian, 2019: 84; Sambaiga et al, 2018: 14).…”