Periodicity of pricing and marketing efforts in a distribution channel

Karray, Salma

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2013.02.012

Cited by 62 publications

(50 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…For convenience and simplify the problem behind in this paper, we assume that the third derivative of ( ) is positive, i.e., ′′′ ( ) > 0. (Notes : we review the demand function related to cooperative advertising and game, we find that the most literatures either adopt a square root function ( [19]- [24]) or a power function ( [5], [19], [25], [26]) to describe the form of the market demand related to advertising expenditures, while only few literature [27], [28] use the linear demand function. So, we do not consider the linear demand, after computing the third order derivative of the other demand function(i.e., the square root function and the power function)with respect to advertising expenditures, we give the assumptions above).…”

Section: Assumptions and The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Supply Chain Cooperative Advertising and Ordering Model for the Loss Averse Retailer

Jiang¹

2018

IJAPM

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Abstract:The loss averse retailer sells the newsboy type of product to the consumers in a one-period two-echelon supply chain, where the risk neutral manufacturer supply the product to the retailer. When the market demand only depend on the retailer's advertising investment and is uncertain, this paper discusses the manufacturer's participation rate ,the retailer's advertising expenditures and order quantity decision problems in a Stackelberg game. After characterizing the equilibrium solution of this game, this paper show the effect of each parameter on optimal decisions. The results reveal that the loss averse retailer's optimal order quantity is less than the risk neutral retailer's optimal decision and decrease as the loss aversion level increases. Maybe it's the reason that the upstream manufacturer will share the advertising investment of the downstream retailer, the retailer's optimal local advertising expenditure is yet greater than the risk neutral retailer's optimal decision and is increasing in the loss aversion level. When the degree of loss aversion become larger ,the manufacturer's optimal participation rate first increases and then decreases until zero. The numerical example is given to analyze the effects of parameter on some optimal decisions and also confirm the relevant conclusion.

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Section: Assumptions and The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The demand function is a square root function, this form of demand function has been widely used in a large number of literatures [21], [24]. We let a 0 = 1and k = 0.7.…”

Section: Numerical Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Supply Chain Cooperative Advertising and Ordering Model for the Loss Averse Retailer

Jiang¹

2018

IJAPM

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“…SeyedEsfahani et al [19] investigate cooperative advertisement in a bilevel supply chain considering a more comprehensive demand function under four power scenarios: equal power, manufacturer-Stackelberg, retailer-Stackelberg, and cooperation among the members; the results are then compared. Aust and Buscher [20], Haifang et al [21], Karray [22], and Kunter [23] are among the other papers that study the simultaneous e ects of advertising and pricing policies.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Inspired by their work, we use a similar form for price demand function, (1 :p) 1=v , in this paper. As for the advertising e ect, we apply the square root form of advertising demand function proposed by [14,[18][19][20]22,23] and adapt it to a supply chain with K di erent markets (n 1 k :…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

A bi-level programming model for decentralized manufacturer-distributer supply chain considering cooperative advertising

2017

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Abstract. This paper studies a bi-level decentralized supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one distributor. Along with global advertising, the manufacturer participates in part of local advertising expenditure incurred by the distributor. Bi-level programming is applied to model the relationship between the manufacturer and distributer under two power scenarios of Stackelberg game framework. In the rst scenario, we consider the manufacturer as the leader and in the latter, we allow the distributer to act as the dominant member of the supply chain. In order to tackle bi-level programming models, a meta-heuristic genetic algorithm with hierarchical structure is developed for each scenario and optimal policies for the members in terms of pricing, advertising, inventory, and demand allocation are determined. Finally, several computational experiments are conducted on the data obtained from an automotive spare parts supply chain to demonstrate the validity of the developed models and compare the bene ts of members as well as of the entire system.

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“…Prior studies have examined price and service decisions under channel competition (Tsay & Agrawal, 2000;Chen et al, 2008;Bernstein & Federgruen, 2004;Dan et al, 2012), optimal coordination design and coordination (Bernstein & Federgruen, 2007;Mukhopadhyay et al, 2009;Ma et al, 2013a;Krishnan et al, 2004;He et al, 2009) and effects of the channel power structures (Lu et al, 2011;Tang et al, 2012;Gurnani et al, 2007;Karray, 2013). Perry and Porter (1990) investigated resale price maintenance by a monopoly manufacturer who sells its product through monopolistically competitive retailers when the retailers provide service.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Supply chain coordination via a two-part tariff contract with price and sales effort dependent demand

Liu¹

2015

10.5267/j.dsl

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This paper studies the channel coordination between a supplier and a retailer with price and sales effort dependent demand. By means of game theory, we analyze price and sales effort decisions of the centralized supply chain. Then we consider three different contracts under decentralized model, i.e., wholesale price contract, cost-sharing contract and a two-part tariff contract, in which the supplier offers a contract comprising a wholesale price and a lump-sum fee to the retailer to coordinate the supply chain. Finally, we analyze the results to compare the equilibrium decisions under different contract scenarios. Our results show that both the wholesale price contract and the cost-sharing contract cannot coordinate the supply chain while the two-part tariff contract can effectively coordinate the supply chain.

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Periodicity of pricing and marketing efforts in a distribution channel

Cited by 62 publications

References 36 publications

Supply Chain Cooperative Advertising and Ordering Model for the Loss Averse Retailer

Supply Chain Cooperative Advertising and Ordering Model for the Loss Averse Retailer

A bi-level programming model for decentralized manufacturer-distributer supply chain considering cooperative advertising

Supply chain coordination via a two-part tariff contract with price and sales effort dependent demand

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