2016
DOI: 10.1007/s10551-016-3273-9
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Permanency of CSR Activities and Firm Value

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Cited by 47 publications
(33 citation statements)
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“…In contrast, family firms could cause type II agency problem that controlling families with great decision‐making power expropriate outside stakeholders, including suppliers and minority shareholders, to achieve their noneconomic objectives (Li, Wu, & Song, 2017; Masulis & Reza, 2015; Yu et al, 2019). In South Korea, family firms employ opportunistically controlling mechanism, including pyramiding and cross‐shareholding, to exert greater voting rights over cash‐flow rights on the firms (Jeong, Jeong, Lee, & Bae, 2018; Terlaak et al, 2018). Directors of boards, executives in top management teams, and managers at key positions in general also are appointed by controlling families (Luo & Chung, 2013).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In contrast, family firms could cause type II agency problem that controlling families with great decision‐making power expropriate outside stakeholders, including suppliers and minority shareholders, to achieve their noneconomic objectives (Li, Wu, & Song, 2017; Masulis & Reza, 2015; Yu et al, 2019). In South Korea, family firms employ opportunistically controlling mechanism, including pyramiding and cross‐shareholding, to exert greater voting rights over cash‐flow rights on the firms (Jeong, Jeong, Lee, & Bae, 2018; Terlaak et al, 2018). Directors of boards, executives in top management teams, and managers at key positions in general also are appointed by controlling families (Luo & Chung, 2013).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For this purpose, we retrieve CSR scores in various dimensions, reported in MCSI ESG, and construct a CSR index ( CSR_Index ) by following Jo and Na (2012), Baron, Harjoto, and Jo (2011), and Hillman and Keim (2001). Subsequently, we calculate the CSR permanency by following the methodology proposed by Jeong, Jeong, Lee, and Bae (2018). In so doing, we first calculate the CSR industrial mean based on CSR index for each industry for each country.…”
Section: Data and Mthodologymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In so doing, we first calculate the CSR industrial mean based on CSR index for each industry for each country. Second, following Jeong et al (2018), DeBenedetti (2017), and H. Kim, Hoskisson, and Wan (2004), we create CSR permanency dummy ( CSRPerm ) which takes value 1 if CSR index of a firm is greater than its respective industrial CSR mean for 3 times or more in previous 4 years. We consider minimum three years to determine the firms' CSR permanency as DeBenedetti (2017) and H. Kim et al (2004) explicitly suggest that to determine the consistency and trend of firm's policies and their impact on corporate outcomes, at least preceding three years should be considered.…”
Section: Data and Mthodologymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The 240 remaining firms were then categorized into 15 industries (distribution shown in the second column of Table 1) based on the 2012 China Securities Regulatory Commission industrial classification system. The firms were screened based on the two following criteria: (1) removal of firms in Qinghai and Tibet due to the absence of their data in the Business Environment Index for China's Provinces, and (2) removal of financial firms such as those in the bank and insurance industries due to the particularities of their business operations and financial structures [69]. As a result, a manufacturer who is in Qinghai was removed from the sample, and 33 financial firms were eliminated.…”
Section: Data Sources and Samplementioning
confidence: 99%