Permanent Value

Abstract

Temporal nihilism is the view that our lives will not matter after we die. According to the standard interpretation, this is because our lives will not make a permanent difference. Many who consider the view thus reject it by denying that our lives need to have an eternal impact. However, in this essay, I develop a different formulation of temporal nihilism revolving around the persistence of personal value itself. According to this more powerful conception of nihilism, we do not have personal value after death, so our past life no longer has well-being after we die. The standard objections to the standard interpretation do not apply to this more nihilistic nihilism. I offer a new response according to which personal value persists after death because the person continues to exist.

Value after death

“…In earlier work (Frugé, in press‐a), I suggested that we adopt a conception of the subject of wellbeing as persisting in some manner after death. There, I argued that we cannot simply shift the subject of wellbeing to something that—while lasting longer than the biological or psychological person—itself comes to an end, such as a person's life as events about them (à la Kagan, 1992, 1994) or social practices surrounding the person (à la Stokes, 2019).…”