Personal Information Disclosure under Competition for Benefits: Is Sharing Caring?

Abstract

Personal information is shared extensively every day, partly in exchange for benefits or as a reaction to other people's information sharing. In this paper, we experimentally investigate these two motives by analyzing the interaction of peer comparison and incentives to disclose potentially privacy-sensitive information. We find that information sharing is higher under incentives, and further increases under peer comparison. This effect is driven by those initially disclosing less, who additionally report to feel more compelled to reveal information. Our results provide an explanation for the current information sharing trend while pointing to a potentially neglected side effect.

Paying with your personal data: the insensitivity of private information provision to asymmetric benefits

“…The questions generally have non-verifiable answers. In this, our design resembles other experimental protocols using questions with non-verifiable answers, e.g Ackfeld and Güth (2019). orFrik and Gaudeul (2020).…”

“…allow subjects to reveal their true names in a partner selection experiment. Revelation leads to vulnerability, but also to partnerships that are more profitable Ackfeld and Güth (2019). study how hiding personal information can be a signal for non-cooperative intentions.…”