Personal Law and Human Rights in India and Israel

Abstract

Although India and Israel differ dramatically in size, population, and affluence, there are many important similarities. Each is the contemporary vehicle of an old and resilient civilization that expresses a distinctive, influential and enduring arrangement of the various facets of human experience. Each of these cultures underwent a prolonged colonial experience in which its traditions were disrupted and subordinated to a hegemonic European Christian culture; each had an earlier experience with victorious, expansive Islam; each has reached an uneasy but flourishing accommodation with the secular, scientific modernity of the West.In each case this was achieved by a movement that embraced “Enlightenment” values and in turn provoked a recoil from modernity/rediscovery of tradition. In each there is a conflict between those with “modern” secular views of civil society and those revivalists or fundamentalists who seek to restore an indigenous religiously based society. The secular nationalism that predominated in the struggle for independence and the formation of the state is now countered by powerful tides of fundamentalism.

Policy Analysis beyond Personal Law: Muslim Women's Rights in India

“…For instance, while the Muslim Personal Law in Bangladesh has been changed dramatically (a state with a majority of Muslims), the Hindu Personal Law in Bangladesh has remained largely untouched in the postcolonial era, forming a mirror image of nonintervention in minority affairs. Indian Christian women also struggle and protest against the obstacles Christian Personal Law poses on women who seek divorce (Galanter and Krishnan , 110). The situation becomes highly fragile when the women of a particular group are less powerful, with a weaker sociopolitical status.…”

“…There were a few exceptions, nonetheless, to the state's hands‐off policy toward Muslims. Galanter and Krishnan (, 113‐4) identified two cases where court intervention in Muslim Personal Law did not spark a public storm. The Supreme Court ruled in these cases that according to India's criminal law, women were eligible to receive alimony beyond the three‐month postdivorce period (the idatt ) set by the Muslim Sharia .…”

“…The Supreme Court ruled in these cases that according to India's criminal law, women were eligible to receive alimony beyond the three‐month postdivorce period (the idatt ) set by the Muslim Sharia . At the time, Muslims did not publicly object to the rulings because, as Galanter and Krishnan () claim, the presiding judge, Krishna Iyer, did not hand down a universal judgment abrogating the Sharia ; rather, he limited the scope of his decisions to the specific cases involving the women who demanded additional compensation.…”

Notes on the Anomaly of the Shari'a Field in Israel

“…In India in the late 1950s, the unwillingness of the Muslim community, headed by several prestigious religious personalities, to relinquish the shari'a (or the Anglo-Muhammadan law administered in its name) brought to a halt parliamentary attempts to reform the Indian personal-status regime. 85 irty years later, the Indian 'ulama' establishment was able to mobilize the Muslim masses to carry out demonstrations in reaction to a controversial judgment of the Indian Supreme Court. is decision, the famous case of Shah Banu, was denounced by the 'ulama' establishment as contradictory to shari'a principles, and was therefore perceived by the Muslim public as marking the end of Muslim personal law in India.…”

Loyal Opposition: Minorities and State Law

“… There is a growing interest in comparing varieties of South Asian nationalism and Zionism (Devji ; Walzer ). Similarly, there is a growing interest in comparing aspects of the Israeli and South Asian legal history, such as the history of personal law (Galanter and Krishnan ); colonial lawyering (Sharafi ); constitutional law (Jacobson ; Barak‐Erez ; Lerner ); or the impact of postcolonial partitions on property and citizenship laws in both places (Berda ; Kedar ).…”