2011
DOI: 10.1016/j.paid.2011.07.007
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Personality accounts for stable preferences and expectations across a range of simple games

Abstract: Personality accounts for stable preferences and expectations across a range of simple gamesCitation for published version: Brocklebank, S, Lewis, GJ & Bates, TC 2011, 'Personality accounts for stable preferences and expectations across a range of simple games' Personality and Individual Differences, vol. 51, no. 8, Publisher Rights Statement: NOTICE: this is the author's version of a work that was accepted for publication in Personality and Individual Differences Changes resulting from the publishing process, … Show more

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Cited by 82 publications
(35 citation statements)
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“…Furthermore, all conditions (including the neutrally-framed dictator game) were administered in a similar fashion within the same session, yet the correlation between HEXACO honesty-humility and standard dictator allocations (r = 0.29) was on par with those in previous studies: both where the two had been separated in time (e.g., rs = 0.25, 0.27, 0.29) [5,8,44] and collected together (rs = 0.24, 0.27) [71,72]; for an exception see [73]. These observations are in line with a wider literature showing that prosocial decisions are stable over time and can be consistently predicted by theoretically-relevant measures of personality [74,75].…”
Section: Limitations and Future Directionssupporting
confidence: 89%
“…Furthermore, all conditions (including the neutrally-framed dictator game) were administered in a similar fashion within the same session, yet the correlation between HEXACO honesty-humility and standard dictator allocations (r = 0.29) was on par with those in previous studies: both where the two had been separated in time (e.g., rs = 0.25, 0.27, 0.29) [5,8,44] and collected together (rs = 0.24, 0.27) [71,72]; for an exception see [73]. These observations are in line with a wider literature showing that prosocial decisions are stable over time and can be consistently predicted by theoretically-relevant measures of personality [74,75].…”
Section: Limitations and Future Directionssupporting
confidence: 89%
“…The literature offers many “roads” to utilitarian judgment, and it is unclear whether these findings represent truly different roads or are manifestations of an overarching latent factor on which utilitarians and non‐utilitarians differ (cf. Brocklebank, Lewis, & Bates, ). What this dispute clearly highlights, however, is an important aim for future research: to understand the reasons behind people's judgments, as well as the need for moral judgment theorists to account not only for what a person believes, but why he or she believes it.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is characterized by intellectual curiosity, imagination, and preferences for variety, and is linked to greater risk taking (Lauriola & Levin, 2001) and liberal political orientation (Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008;Chirumbolo & Leone, 2010). This could in part explain its positive relationships with decisions to cooperate in the prisoner's dilemma (Lönnqvist et al, 2011), amounts sent and returned in the trust game (Becker et al, 2012; but see Ben-Ner & Halldorsson, 2010), and allocations of wealth in dictator games (Baumert et al, 2013;Becker et al, 2012;Ben-Ner, Putterman, Kong, & Magan, 2004;Hilbig et al, 2013), as well as prosocial choices in two-person exchange tasks (Brocklebank et al, 2011).…”
Section: Beyond the Interpersonal Domain: The Roles Of Neuroticism Omentioning
confidence: 99%