Personalized commissioning, public spaces: the limits of the market in English social care services

Abstract

BackgroundThe article explores the implications of personal budgets within English social care services, which position the individual as market actor. Rooting the research in the broader personalization agenda, the study looks at the limitations of the market in relation to individual purchase of private goods (e.g. home care), in the pooling of funds to purchase group services and in the provision of public goods such as building-based services.MethodThe article takes a multi-method approach, combining an interpretive focus on the framing of the personal budget-holder by advocates of personalization with national evaluation data, and data from a small survey of day centre workers.ResultsThe article identifies three framings of the individual budget-holder articulated by advocates of personalization. The first is that personal budget-holders will be empowered market actors, commissioning the services they need. The second is that budget-holders will pool resources with others to purchase group services in order to broaden the range of options available to them. The third is that services which cannot be disaggregated into individual or group budgets – such as day centres – are not valued by service users. The article looks at the evaluation data on these three claims in turn. It identifies four limitations to the capacity of people to purchase care goods on an individual basis: lack of transparency in allocating budgets, complexity in managing a budget, excessive auditing of spending and lack of responsiveness from the provider market. Pooling of budgets to purchase collective services is found to be underdeveloped, and hampered by the complexity which is a broader limitation on personal budgets. Day centres are found to be closing not in response to commissioning decisions by individual budget-holders but because of decommissioning by local authorities, minimising the scope for individuals to express a preference for this type of care. The survey highlights patterns of day centre closure, rising fees for attendance and reduced eligibility, and the underdevelopment of mechanisms to facilitate commissioning of new collective spaces.ConclusionsThe paper concludes that the transition to personal budgets – in the context of the accompanying financial crisis in local authorities – has led to inadequate attention to the potential for an undersupply of collective and public goods. The loss of day centre provision will be felt by personal budget holders but also by self-funders and people in residential accommodation who may no longer be eligible for, or able to afford, to access shared spaces. Local authorities are actively taking on the role of decommissioners without sufficient responsiveness to how and what individuals want them to commission.

Making sense of joint commissioning: three discourses of prevention, empowerment and efficiency

“…For instance, in the Working Together for Change policy [44] this is expressed in terms of transforming adult social care away from professionally-led service delivery towards a user-led model which involves the design, commissioning and evaluation of individual services. Such an approach is bound up in the core values of the personalisation agenda (see Catherine Needham’s paper in this supplement for more information on this [51]) where “the services people use are based on their circumstances, need, preference and desired outcomes” [52] p. 5. The idea here is that “if service users are able to direct their support in a truly personalised way then joint commissioning is needed to effectively manage markets and provide the support that these micro commissioners need”.…”

Choice and control in social care: Experiences of older self‐funders in England

“…The introduction of a quasi‐market in social care aimed to drive up quality, efficiency, and service responsiveness through competition and consumer choice (Clarke, Newman, & Westmarland, ; Glendinning, ; Lewis & Glennerster, ; Rodrigues & Glendinning, ). Such market‐based systems place the service user in the central role of consumer, as a rational actor empowered to commission services from a range of suitable options available in a free market (Christensen & Pilling, ; Needham, ). The ideology of consumerism ran in parallel with economic arguments for markets and choice.…”

Mixed accountability within new public governance: The case of a personalized welfare scheme in early implementation

“…Unlike personalized schemes in other countries, the Australian NDIS is attempting to be fully functional in just 5 years. This is in contrast to the 25‐year implementation of the NHS in the United Kingdom and similar time frames in Norway (Askheim, Bengtsson, & Richter Bjelke, ; Needham, ).…”

“…The accountability dilemmas found in personalization schemes in general (Gash et al, ; Needham, ) and in the Australian NDIS in particular (Dickinson, ; Malbon et al, ) are not likely to be solved by using new public managerialism approaches to accountability that emphasize outcomes such as performance reporting, outcome statements, program deliverables, and key performance indicators (Mattei, ). Such performance indicators and monitoring may show red flags, but do not in themselves constitute ameliorative action.…”