Personalized Foreign Policy Decision-making and Economic Dependence: A Comparative Study of Thailand and the Philippines' China Policies

Zha, Wen

doi:10.1355/cs37-2d

Cited by 15 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…While personalised foreign policymaking is usually less time‐consuming and more efficient, it is more likely to suffer from discontinuities in the political system for two reasons. First, personalised foreign policies or decisions made by individual leaders are usually not as legitimate as those through institutional channels and more likely to be contested by political opposition (Zha, 2015: 246). Despite the inconclusive debates over the sources of political legitimacy, there is growing recognition that procedure generates more stable and sustainable legitimacy than performance, even in authoritarian systems (Birney, 2017; Von Soest and Grauvogel, 2018; Tallberg and Zürn, 2019).…”

Section: Varieties Of Politicisation: Conceptual Causal and Consequen...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Despite the inconclusive debates over the sources of political legitimacy, there is growing recognition that procedure generates more stable and sustainable legitimacy than performance, even in authoritarian systems (Birney, 2017; Von Soest and Grauvogel, 2018; Tallberg and Zürn, 2019). Second, in personalised policymaking, the incumbent is more likely to attack the predecessor's policies in order to legitimise his or her own, once power transition takes place (Zha, 2015: 246). This kind of policy reversals is not uncommon, in no matter authoritarian or democratic countries.…”

Section: Varieties Of Politicisation: Conceptual Causal and Consequen...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Infrastructure and politics: Why the Belt and Road Initiative proceeded differently in Malaysia and Indonesia

Wang

2023

Asia Pacific Viewpoint

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The article seeks to understand the different types and sources of politicisation as well as the consequences for Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure projects. It is argued that while the personalised insulated type of foreign policymaking is conducive to intra‐system politicisation, the institutionalised responsive type is associated with extra‐system politicisation. While the former type is contingent on political turnovers and brings about abrupt shocks, the latter oftentimes generates societal pushback from socio‐economic groups. The article focuses on two flagship Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure projects in Malaysia and Indonesia. Based on fieldwork interviews and process tracing, the article finds that the East Coast Rail Link project in Malaysia has suffered from high risk of political interruption owing to Malaysia's personalised insulated type of foreign policymaking, whereas the Jakarta–Bandung High Speed Rail project in Indonesia has encountered sustained obstacles from Indonesian society and brought about substantial delays under Indonesia's institutionalised responsive type.

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Section: Varieties Of Politicisation: Conceptual Causal and Consequen...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Varieties Of Politicisation: Conceptual Causal and Consequen...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Infrastructure and politics: Why the Belt and Road Initiative proceeded differently in Malaysia and Indonesia

Wang

2023

Asia Pacific Viewpoint

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“…Against this domestic political background, Aquino attached more importance to the South China Sea issue. Tensions with China generated a “rally round the flag effect,” bolstering Aquino’s legitimacy at home (Zha 2015 , 242–268).…”

Section: The Breakdown and Restoration Of The Philippines’ Hedging St...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Leader security and hedging in the era of great power rivalry: responses of the Philippines and Singapore

Zha

2022

China Int Strategy Rev.

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As great power competition escalates, secondary states may find their hedging strategies encounter greater systemic and domestic challenges. Existing literature suggests that competing great powers exert more pressure on hedgers, pushing them to choose a side. Nevertheless, in the real world, the sustainability of hedging varies across countries. In a departure from previous studies that emphasize systemic pressure, this article highlights the domestic pressure decision-makers face. It argues that the public prefers a consistent foreign policy strategy and is likely to be skeptical of hedging that contains contradictory security, economic, and political policies. Nevertheless, leaders serve as a transmission belt between systemic and domestic pressure at one end and foreign strategy at the other. Specifically, leaders with a solid support base at home enjoy greater autonomy in foreign policymaking and have a better chance of maintaining an intense hedging strategy. On the contrary, insecure leaders are more likely to cater to the public and adopt a more consistent foreign strategy, which implies the breakdown of hedging. This theoretical framework is illustrated with two cases: the China strategies of the Philippines and Singapore.

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“…At the beginning of Aquino III’s tenure, his top agenda on national security was the war on terror in the country, not the PLAN’s limited footprint in the vast area of the western Pacific Ocean. However, later, for most of his presidency, the South China Sea disputes soured China–Philippines relations, and Beijing tried to coerce Manila on the issue, resulting in unprecedented friction[ 74 ]. 1 Furthermore, many Filipinos have grown distrustful of China, as shown by an opinion poll conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2019.…”

Section: How the Philippines Is Important To Chinamentioning

confidence: 99%

Asymmetry Theory and China–Philippines Relations with the South China Sea as a Case

Yamazaki

Osawa

2021

East Asia

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This article analyzes how the structural factor of asymmetry affects China’s relations with a small power. As the studies of Brantly Womack suggest, asymmetry theory is conducive to deepening the understanding of China’s relations with smaller countries. We argue that an examination of China–Philippines relations from 2010 to 2020 indicates that Beijing has trouble managing its ties with Manila because of the asymmetry in the nature of the relations, which originates in the power and status gaps between them. The asymmetrical structure of this bilateral interplay inclines China to underestimate and neglect the Philippines’ intentions and determination to resist, which has been made especially clear in the South China Sea disputes. As a result, their relationship experienced repeated ups and downs throughout the 2010s, in particular over the maritime sovereignty issue. This study also hints at the complicated situations surrounding China where many medium-sized and small states attempt to maneuver among great powers. Without affinities with such governments in the Indo-Pacific region, it will be difficult for Beijing to achieve a peaceful rise and acquire status as a next-generation superpower.

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Personalized Foreign Policy Decision-making and Economic Dependence: A Comparative Study of Thailand and the Philippines' China Policies

Cited by 15 publications

References 39 publications

Infrastructure and politics: Why the Belt and Road Initiative proceeded differently in Malaysia and Indonesia

Infrastructure and politics: Why the Belt and Road Initiative proceeded differently in Malaysia and Indonesia

Leader security and hedging in the era of great power rivalry: responses of the Philippines and Singapore

Asymmetry Theory and China–Philippines Relations with the South China Sea as a Case

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