Personhood and Rights in an African Tradition

Abstract

It is generally accepted that the normative idea of personhood is central to African moral thought, but what has not been done in the literature is to explicate its relationship to the Western idea of rights. In this article, I investigate this relationship between rights and an African normative conception of personhood. My aim, ultimately, is to give us a cursory sense why duties engendered by rights and those by the idea of personhood will tend to clash. To facilitate a meaningful philosophical discussion, I locate this engagement in the context of a debate between Ifeanyi Menkiti and Kwame Gyekye about the nature of Afrocommunitarianism, whether it will ground rights as primary or secondary. I endorse Menkiti's stance that duties are primary and rights secondary; and, I also problematise moderate communitarianism for taking a Western stance by employing a naturalist approach to rights.

Championing the resilience of sub-Saharan adolescents: pointers for psychologists

“…For instance, given the continued marginalization of sub-Saharan adolescent girls and the rising incidence of stressors relating to climate change, a particularly pressing agenda is identifying those resources that best protect sub-Saharan adolescent girls in the face and/or aftermath of extreme weather events, disruptive climatic events, or natural disasters. In addition, it is important to better understand whether/how traditional African values and practices (which remain important in many sub-Saharan communities; Motsamai, 2018; Ramphele, 2012) shape the resources that impact the resilience of sub-Saharan adolescents differentially. Such accounts have the potential to further advance decolonized insights into adolescent resilience (Theron, Theron, & Malindi, 2013; Van Breda, 2018).…”

“…Conventionally, African children were socialized to value their connectedness to a social ecology (Nsamenang, 2006). Although this practice has faced challenges, many Africans continue to valorize connectedness and the benefits that reciprocal connectedness brings (Motsamai, 2018; Ramphele, 2012). As connected beings, African adolescents ‘[are] a support system and have a support system’ (Hunter, 2001, p. 178).…”

Personhood and (Rectification) Justice in African Thought

“…Further, Metz takes a rights-based approach to address historical injustices. Elsewhere, I have argued that rights are incompatible with much of African moral-political thinking, particularly the moral logic inherent in the idea of personhood (Molefe 2017a). Elsewhere, I also argued that the theory that Metz relies on to address historical injustices is implausible, and, as such, if I am correct, it should not be taken seriously (Molefe 2017b).…”

Personhood and a meaningful life in African philosophy

“…Space does not quite allow me to motivate and justify why we should take seriously the moral vision of personhood. In several places, I have proffered justifications of personhood as a moral theory (see Molefe 2018;2019a;2020a).…”