Perspectival Models and Theory Unification

Abstract

Given that scientific realism is based on the assumption that there is a connection between a model's predictive success and its truth, and given the success of multiple incompatible models in scientific practice, the realist has a problem. When the different models can be shown to arise as different approximations to a unified theory, however, one might think the realist to be able to accommodate such cases. I discuss a special class of models (generated as non-uniform limits of a unified theory) and argue that a realist interpretation has to understand these models of a system as 'perspectival', in close analogy to different spatial perspectives onto the same object. For this sort of case, I also respond to Morrison's recent claim that in the process of unifying models into an overarching theory, explanatory and descriptive power are lost, leaving the unified theory with less of a claim to a realist interpretation than the models themselves. 1 Introduction 2 Perspectival models from singular perturbation problems 3 Unification of perspectives without losses of explanatory power 4 Perspectives as different levels of a system 5 Perspectival models, idealizations and pluralism

Dialoging in good form: A response to Rom Harré, Jack Martin, and Mark Freeman's responses to “Form Psychology”

“…I remain convinced that the most comprehensive understanding of any object of a science will be best produced by some kind of perspectival realism (Rueger, 2005) that can encompass as many legitimate perspectives on the object as we can obtain. It is hoped that even this conversation has shown the fruit of patient listening that looks for commonalities where possible, without avoiding the inevitable disagreements that occur.…”

Multiscale Phenomena in Biology and Scientific Perspectivism

“…Given the success of multiple incompatible models in scientific practice, the realist has a problem. However, Rueger (2005), following Giere, argues that if the different models can be shown to arise as different approximations to a unified theory, the realist is able to accommodate such cases when these models are understood as perspectival.…”

Rational analyses, instrumentalism, and implementations

“…Philosophical work on intertheoretic relations suggests a different understanding of 'implementation': namely, that the mathematics of the high-level theory is a special or limiting case of the mathematics of the lower-level theory (Batterman, 2002;Nickles, 1973;Rueger, 2001Rueger, , 2005Smith, 1998). For example, Newtonian mechanics in a collection of indistinguishable particles is a limiting case implementation of the ideal gas law, since the latter is a limiting case of the relevant statistical mechanics equations in the former.…”

“…Much of the recent philosophical literature has focused on the difficulties that can arise when the limit process yields a singular limit (e.g., Batterman, 2002;Rueger, 2005); those issues have not arisen in the psychological literature.…”