Persuading to participate: Coordination on a standard

Price Commitments in Standard Setting under Asymmetric Information*

“…For the most part, the literature has ignored asymmetric information about the benefits and costs of technologies vying for inclusion in a standard, which is the focus of our paper. The exceptions-though different in focus from us-are Farrell and Simcoe [2012], Lerner et al [2016], Bonatti and Rantakari [2016] and Balzer and Schneider [2021]. Farrell and Simcoe [2012] and Bonatti and Rantakari [2016] model standard setting as a war of attrition.…”

“…The exceptions—though different in focus from us—are Farrell and Simcoe [2012], Lerner et al . [2016], Bonatti and Rantakari [2016] and Balzer and Schneider [2021]. Farrell and Simcoe [2012] and Bonatti and Rantakari [2016] model standard setting as a war of attrition.…”

“…By contrast, in our model it is the implementer that holds private information about the profitability of a technology. Finally, Balzer and Schneider [2021] model coordination among competitors in standard setting, in the shadow of a market mechanism, under private information about each innovator's chances in a standards war.…”