2013
DOI: 10.3386/w19602
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Perverse Consequences of Well Intentioned Regulation: Evidence from India's Child Labor Ban

Abstract: Said for insightful discussions on the topic. Zachary Breig provided excellent research assistance. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peerreviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

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Cited by 31 publications
(21 citation statements)
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“…These strategies will likely fail to eradicate child labor and improve living conditions for children (Budhwani, Wee, & McLean, 2004; Morrow, 2010) because a host of factors promotes or maintains child labor, including (but not limited to) the unavailability or prohibitive costs of quality schooling, gender-based cultural norms, the unavailability of alternative labor sources, and individual family needs. For example, there is some evidence that a national ban on child labor only serves to push children into lower-paying and less regulated jobs, which encourages parents to send children into labor more (Bharaswaj, Lakdawala, & Li, 2013; Edmonds, 2003). …”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These strategies will likely fail to eradicate child labor and improve living conditions for children (Budhwani, Wee, & McLean, 2004; Morrow, 2010) because a host of factors promotes or maintains child labor, including (but not limited to) the unavailability or prohibitive costs of quality schooling, gender-based cultural norms, the unavailability of alternative labor sources, and individual family needs. For example, there is some evidence that a national ban on child labor only serves to push children into lower-paying and less regulated jobs, which encourages parents to send children into labor more (Bharaswaj, Lakdawala, & Li, 2013; Edmonds, 2003). …”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…He …nds that reaching the eligibility age makes a child more likely to work but not so much because it also simultaneously reduces his siblings' probability of work. These spillovers within families are also emphasized in Bharadwaj et al (2013), who study the introduction of minimum working age legislation in modern India. Using employment surveys conducted before and after the 1986 law, and age restrictions that determined whom the ban applied to, they show that the relative probability of child employment actually increased.…”
Section: Mininum Age Regulation In the Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…In what follows, we shall use a variable drawn from Almeida and Carneiro (2009), namely the proportion of inspectors per …rm in a given municipality. 8 Second, there may be heterogeneity in compliance across di¤erent types of child activities. In principle, the Brazilian Constitution does not specify that the minimum age regulation should apply to a particular type of sector or activity.…”
Section: Institutional Contextmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Further, some evidence points out that child labor legislation has had the opposite effect. Bharadwaj and colleagues () argue that as a result of India's Child Labour Prohibition and Regulation Act (1986), children's wages decreased, causing poor households to utilize even more child labor. According to this study's findings, new regulation could thus affect 49% of child laborers who are receiving wages.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%