2020
DOI: 10.1109/lwc.2019.2949316
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Phantom Eavesdropping With Whitened RF Leakage

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
5
0

Year Published

2021
2021
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
6

Relationship

2
4

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 7 publications
(5 citation statements)
references
References 8 publications
0
5
0
Order By: Relevance
“…The attacks are based on the captured signals without presence of the auxiliary tag. Since the tag owners are expected to be in various circumstances, the attacker can exploit active eavesdropping outside reader's interrogation range [25], [38].…”
Section: A Adversarial Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The attacks are based on the captured signals without presence of the auxiliary tag. Since the tag owners are expected to be in various circumstances, the attacker can exploit active eavesdropping outside reader's interrogation range [25], [38].…”
Section: A Adversarial Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…1 Due to the broadcast of wireless transmission, both B and E receive confidential messages from A, even though A only wants to convey its confidential messages to B. Since a fraction of the local oscillator signal can leak out from the local oscillator of E [12], A is supposed to have the statistical knowledge of the estimated eavesdropping channels.…”
Section: A System Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For our implementation, the legitimate receiver cannot decode the packet with |f a-CFO | ≥ 50 kHz. According to [46], CFO over 600 kHz hinders the legitimate decoding. However, the target signals have consistent CFO for the entire packet, whereas our implementation includes OFDM block-wise CFOs, which require more stringent restrictions.…”
Section: Artificial Cfo-based Covert Channel Attackmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As A-CFO value increases, the variance of the corresponding distribution also increases. There are noticeable differences when the A-CFO value is injected with the size of 100 kHz and 1 MHz, but the legitimate channel cannot be maintained because the frame cannot be recognized at the legitimate receiver [46]. It is worth noting that the attacker who wants high reliability needs to increase the A-CFO size, but he also should take the high risk of being detected.…”
Section: B Cfo Estimate Distribution Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%