Phenomena in Inverse Stackelberg Games, Part 2: Dynamic Problems

Olsder, Geert Jan

doi:10.1007/s10957-009-9572-x

Cited by 36 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 9 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…We have recently introduced ( [16], [17]) the optimal toll design problem, in which the link tolls are computed as functions of link or route traffic flows in the network. This fits within the theoretical framework of the so-called inverse Stackelberg problems ([18], [19]). We have shown that the traffic-flow dependent toll can improve the traffic system performance remarkably, while it can never perform worse than the trafficflow invariant toll.…”

Section: Introduction and Literature Overviewsupporting

confidence: 67%

On dynamic optimal toll design problem with traffic-flow dependent tolls and drivers' joint route and departure time choices

Staňková

2009

2009 IEEE International Conference on Control Applications

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper the dynamic optimal toll design problem as a game of the Stackelberg type is investigated, with the road authority as leader and drivers on the road network as followers. The road authority sets dynamic trafficflow dependent tolls on some links in order to minimize its objective function, while the drivers choose their routes and departure times so as to minimize their own perceived travel costs, which include a travel time component, tolls, and penalties for deviation from their preferred arrival and departure times. The drivers' behavior is modeled using a dynamic user equilibrium model. We define the problem in a general form so that a wide class of objective functions for the road authority and a wide class of the dynamic traffic equilibria can be employed. We also discuss the problem properties.The problem to find optimal traffic-flow dependent tolls in a general setting introduced in this paper is NP-hard. One of the ways of tackling such problems is to use advanced heuristic methods. In this paper a neurosimulation-based approach is proposed, using the neurosimulator FAUN 1.0.The proposed solution method is illustrated on case studies with the so-called Chen network.

show abstract

Section: Introduction and Literature Overviewsupporting

confidence: 67%

On dynamic optimal toll design problem with traffic-flow dependent tolls and drivers' joint route and departure time choices

Staňková

2009

2009 IEEE International Conference on Control Applications

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…For both players, it concerns a one-shot game. In the subsequent paper [14], dynamic inverse Stackelberg problems will be considered; time evolution plays an essential role in the sense that both players act more than once.…”

Section: Example 14mentioning

confidence: 99%

Phenomena in Inverse Stackelberg Games, Part 1: Static Problems

Olsder

2009

J Optim Theory Appl

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Games are considered in which the role of the players is a hierarchical one. Some players behave as leaders, others as followers. Such games are named after Stackelberg. In the current paper, a special type of these games is considered, known in the literature as inverse Stackelberg games. In such games, the leader (or: leaders) announces his strategy as a mapping from the follower (or: followers) decision space into his own decision space. Arguments for studying such problems are given. The routine way of analysis, leading to a study of composed functions, is not very fruitful. Other approaches are given, mainly by studying specific examples. Phenomena in problems with more than one leader and/or follower are studied within the context of the inverse Stackelberg concept. As a side issue, expressions like "two captains on a ship" and "divide and conquer" are given a mathematical foundation.

show abstract

“…the so-called inverse Stackelberg equilibrium, where the leader does not announce his action u L , but his reaction function γ L (u F ). This concept can be used to enforce a by the leader desired behavior of the follower (see [52], [53]). Closely related to this are games of mechanism design for, so-called, Bayesian games (i.e.…”

Section: Choice Of Actionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Prospects of Tools from Differential Games in the Study of Macroeconomics of Climate Change

Engwerda¹

2012

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this note we sketch a dynamic framework within which the discussion on the macro economic effects of climate change take place. The problem setting is characterized by scientific uncertainties about the development of climate, potential large economic losses and human beings having their specific features. Some considerations about climate change, macroeconomics and their relationship are given. A characteristic feature of the problem setting is that there are multiple decision makers interacting in a dynamic world with large uncertainties. Problems of this type have been studied extensively by (dynamic) game theory. A rough literature review is provided and some items open for future research are indicated.

show abstract

Phenomena in Inverse Stackelberg Games, Part 2: Dynamic Problems

Cited by 36 publications

References 9 publications

On dynamic optimal toll design problem with traffic-flow dependent tolls and drivers' joint route and departure time choices

On dynamic optimal toll design problem with traffic-flow dependent tolls and drivers' joint route and departure time choices

Phenomena in Inverse Stackelberg Games, Part 1: Static Problems

Prospects of Tools from Differential Games in the Study of Macroeconomics of Climate Change

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About