Phenomenal Concepts

Sundström, Pär

doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00384.x

Cited by 31 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 83 publications

(102 reference statements)

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“…The intimate epistemic and metaphysical link between subjects and their phenomenal experiences has intrigued many philosophers. Recently, against the background of discussions over phenomenal concepts and the Phenomenal Concept Strategy (Stoljar, 2005, Alter and Walter, 2007, Sundström, 2011, the debate has come to focus on whether the nature of phenomenal properties is presented to the subjects, a thesis akin to what is often called the Revelation thesis.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Revelation and Phenomenal Relations

Broi¹

2019

The Philosophical Quarterly

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Revelation, or the view that the essence of phenomenal properties is presented to us, is as intuitively attractive as it is controversial. It is notably at the core of defences of anti-physicalism. I propose in this paper a new argument against Revelation. It is usually accepted that low-level sensory phenomenal properties, like phenomenal red, loudness or brightness, stand in (phenomenal) relation of similarity and quantity. Furthermore, these similarity and quantitative relations are taken to be internal, that is, to be fixed by what their relata are. I argue that, under some plausible additional premises, no account of what grounds these relations in the essence of their relata is consistent with Revelation, at least if we take common phenomenological descriptions for granted. As a result, the plausibility of Revelation is undermined. One might however resist this conclusion by weakening the epistemic relation postulated between subjects and their phenomenal properties.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Revelation and Phenomenal Relations

Broi¹

2019

The Philosophical Quarterly

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“…Among the most influential proposals of the view are those of Loar (1997), Tye (2000), Papineau (2002, 2007), and Sturgeon (2000). For a helpful overview of the approach, see Sundström (2011).…”

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“…13 13For objections to the phenomenal concepts strategy, see especially Chalmers (2007), Horgan and Tienson (2001), Tye (2009), and Sundström (2011).…”

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Consciousness and the Prospects for Substance Dualism

Spackman

2013

Philosophy Compass

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There has in recent years been a significant surge of interest in non-materialist accounts of the mind. Property dualists hold that all substances (concrete particulars that persist over time) are material, but mental properties are distinct from physical properties. Substance dualists maintain that the mind or person is a non-material substance. This article considers the prospects for substance dualism given the current state of the debate. The best known type of substance dualism, Cartesian dualism, has traditionally faced a number of objections, but many contemporary philosophers have sought to avoid these by formulating novel versions of the view. I identify three central claims held in common by all forms of substance dualism, consider recent arguments for these claims, and assess how successfully different types of substance dualism respond to the traditional objections. I argue that most contemporary forms of the view still face one or more of three major challenges, from bundle theories of the self, from the recently developed ''phenomenal concepts strategy'', and from worries about explanatory simplicity.

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“…2 2 See for instance Loar (1997), Papineau (2002), Tye (2000), Sundström (2011). This is the type of view that Chalmers (2002) calls “type‐B materialism”. …”

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“… Jackson (1982) actually uses this example to support not the existence of an explanatory gap, but his closely related ''knowledge argument'' against physicalism. 2 See for instanceLoar (1997), Papineau(2002),Tye (2000),Sundström (2011). This is the type of view that Chalmers (2002) calls ''type-B materialism''.…”

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Contemporary Philosophy of Mind and Buddhist Thought

Spackman

2012

Philosophy Compass

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Recent years have seen a growing interest in Buddhist thought as a potential source of alternative conceptions of the nature of the mind and the relation between the mental and the physical. This article considers and assesses three different models of what contemporary philosophy of mind can learn from Buddhist thought. One model, advocated by Alan Wallace, holds that we can learn from Buddhist meditation that both individual consciousness and the physical world itself emerge from a deeper, “primordial” consciousness. A second model, supported by Owen Flanagan, maintains that we should accept from Buddhist thought only what is compatible with physicalism, and thus draws from Buddhism only insights into moral psychology and spirituality. Evan Thompson has developed a third, phenomenological approach, which derives from Buddhism a non‐dualistic account of the relation between the mental and the physical, dissolving the “explanatory gap” between them. I suggest that all of these models face significant challenges, and propose a different model derived from the Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna, which shows the potential to resolve some of the challenges facing contemporary theories of consciousness.

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Phenomenal Concepts

Cited by 31 publications

References 83 publications

Revelation and Phenomenal Relations

Revelation and Phenomenal Relations

Consciousness and the Prospects for Substance Dualism

Contemporary Philosophy of Mind and Buddhist Thought

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