Phenomenal Dogmatism, Seeming Evidentialism and Inferential Justification

Brogaard, Berit

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-95993-1_5

Cited by 34 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 26 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Perhaps the relevant contrasts can be explained not in terms of judgements or beliefs but in terms of some other kind of non-perceptual representation. Brogaard (2018), for instance, posits 'phenomenal seemings' that are neither perceptual nor doxastic. This framework could explain the contrast cases in terms of changes to how things phenomenally seem to one.…”

Section: Against Non-perceptual Explanationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Seeing the forest for the trees: Scene perception and the admissible contents of perceptual Experience

McClelland

2021

PhiMiSci

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Debates surrounding the high-level contents of perceptual experience focus on whether weperceive the high-level properties of visual objects, such as the property of being a pine tree. Thispaper considers instead whether we perceive the high-level properties of visual scenes, such asthe property of being a forest. Liberals about the contents of perceptual experience have offered avariety of phenomenal contrast cases designed to reveal how the high-level properties of objectsfigure in our visual experience. I offer a series of equivalent phenomenal contrast cases intendedto show how the high-level properties of visual scenes also figure in visual experience. Thisfirst-person evidence of high-level scene perception is combined with third-person evidence fromthe extensive empirical literature on scene categorisation. Critics of liberalism have attempted todeflate existing phenomenal contrast cases by explaining the contrasts in terms of non-perceptualcontents or in terms of attentional changes. I show that neither response is applicable to mycontrast cases and conclude that we do indeed perceptually experience the high-level propertiesof visual scenes.

show abstract

Section: Against Non-perceptual Explanationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…1 Conservatives say that the content of visual experience is exhausted by such properties, e.g. Briscoe (2015), Brogaard (2018), Carruthers & Veillet (2011), Price (2009), Prinz (2012). Liberals say that besides these low-level properties, visual experience also represents various 'high-level' properties, e.g.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Seeing the forest for the trees: Scene perception and the admissible contents of perceptual Experience

McClelland

2021

PhiMiSci

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…However, in response, internalists will often point out that our intuitions about Lehrer and Cohen's (1983) New Evil Demon scenario indicate that forming justified beliefs need not be conducive to forming true beliefs. 25 An alternative suggestion when it comes to how access internalists should spell out the idea that one always has justification to believe the facts about justificatory support (i.e., the facts about how one's justifiers support the beliefs they do) has recently been offered by Brogaard (2018). According to Brogaard, facts about justificatory support, which she conceptualizes as facts about evidential probability, are internally accessible in the sense that one has memory-seemings to the effect that they are true.…”

Section: The Accessibility Of Memorial Justificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Against overconfidence: arguing for the accessibility of memorial justification

Egeland

2020

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this article, I argue that access internalism should replace preservationism, which has been called "a received view" in the epistemology of memory, as the standard position about memorial justification. My strategy for doing so is two-pronged. First, I argue that the considerations which motivate preservationism also support access internalism. Preservationism is mainly motivated by its ability to answer the explanatory challenges posed by the problem of stored belief and the problem of forgotten evidence. However, as I will demonstrate, access internalism also has the resources to provide plausible solutions to those problems. Second, I argue that preservationism faces a couple of problems which access internalism avoids. Doing so, I present a new scenario which, on the one hand, functions as a counterexample to preservationism, and, on the other hand, provides intuitive support for access internalism. Moreover, I also demonstrate how preservationism, in light of recent research in cognitive psychology, is vulnerable to skepticism about memorial justification, whereas access internalism remains unthreatened. Keywords Memory • Memorial justification • Access internalism • Reliabilism • Preservationism 1 Memorial justification Many, if not most, of our beliefs are justified by memory. Consider your belief (whether occurrent or dispositional) that Mercury is the smallest planet in our solar system, that Fermat's Last Theorem has been proved to be true, or that Napoleon lost the battle of Waterloo.

show abstract

“…According to these views, the belief that there is now a laptop in front of me is, at least in part, justified in virtue of my perceptual experience of that laptop. Such “experientialist” views of perceptual justification have been defended in different forms: either perceptual experience itself constitutes the perceptual evidence required for perceptual justification (Berghofer, 2020; Chudnoff, 2018; Conee & Feldman, 2004; Huemer, 2001; Moretti, 2015); or perceptual experience gives rise to distinct perceptual seemings, which then constitute the required perceptual evidence (Brogaard, 2013, 2018; Pace, 2017; Reiland, 2015; Tucker, 2010); or perceptual experience immediately justifies propositions about perceptual looks, which then constitute our perceptual evidence (McGrath, 2017, 2018). All of these views take perceptual experience to be an important and sometimes even crucial nexus in the transitioning from perceptual input to perceptual belief, and, because of this, all of these views grant perceptual experience an important role in providing perceptual justification.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…1111At this point, the Looks View appears to become dangerously similar to dogmatism involving perceptual seemings (e.g., Brogaard, 2013, 2018; Pace, 2017; Reiland, 2015 Tucker, 2010). Such versions of dogmatism claim that sensory experiences give rise to (possibly amodal) perceptual seemings, which then justify the relevant perceptual beliefs.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Do looks constitute our perceptual evidence?

Ghijsen¹

2020

Philosophical Issues

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Many philosophers take experience to be an essential aspect of perceptual justification. I argue against a specific variety of such an experientialist view, namely, the Looks View of perceptual justification, according to which our visual beliefs are mediately justified by beliefs about the way things look. I describe three types of cases that put pressure on the idea that perceptual justification is always related to looks-related reasons: unsophisticated cognizers, multimodal identification, and amodal completion. I then provide a tentative diagnosis of what goes wrong in the Looks View: it ascribes a specific epistemic role to beliefs about looks that is actually fulfilled by subpersonal perceptual processes.

show abstract

Phenomenal Dogmatism, Seeming Evidentialism and Inferential Justification

Cited by 34 publications

References 26 publications

Seeing the forest for the trees: Scene perception and the admissible contents of perceptual Experience

Seeing the forest for the trees: Scene perception and the admissible contents of perceptual Experience

Against overconfidence: arguing for the accessibility of memorial justification

Do looks constitute our perceptual evidence?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About