Phenomenological Approaches to Non-Conceptual Content

Abstract

Over the past years McDowell's conceptualist theory has received mixed phenomenological reviews. Some phenomenologists have claimed that conceptualism involves an over-intellectualization of human experience. Others have drawn on Husserl's work, arguing that Husserl's theory of fulfillment challenges conceptualism and that his notion of "real content" is non-conceptual. Still others, by contrast, hold that Husserl's later phenomenology is in fundamental agreement with McDowell's theory of conceptually informed experience. So who is right? This paper purports to show that phenomenology does not have to choose between any of these positions. Central to the outline I offer is that there are multiple approaches to non-conceptual content in play today. By separating them we can begin to oversee the diversity of phenomenological contributions to the debate about non-conceptual content. I conclude that current literature presents us with at least three sound phenomenological accounts of non-conceptual content, but also that these are generally not incompatible with conceptualism.

Gertrud Kuznitzky and Edith Stein on (non)conceptual experience

“…To this end, I find Mazijk's argument convincing that conceptual content of experience, as it is presented by McDowell, presupposes a separation between natural and rational spheres that is foreign to phenomenology, according to which conscious experience is not separated by any such categories, but by levels of constitution, cf. Mazijk (2017). In this regard, the article will not bring forth any arguments as to whether or not Husserl might have been a conceptualist, as has been suggested by Barber (2008) and Mooney (2010).…”

Toril Moi's Phenomenological Account of “Woman” and Questions of Trans Inclusivity

“…For an overview of the debate on the (non)conceptual content of perception, see Toribio 2007. This recent debate is centered around the opposing positions of the conceptualist John McDowell and the nonconceptualist Christopher Peacocke; however, the question has also been treated by previous philosophers, in particular Edmund Husserl (see van Mazijk 2017). For the remainder of the article, I will assume that in many current societies, most persons conceptualize certain subjective body experiences or perceptions as “female” or “male.” For example, I take it that a chubby cis man is likely to perceive as “female” the movement of the fat tissue around his chest when running.…”