Phenomenological explanation: towards a methodological integration in phenomenological psychopathology

Abstract

Whether, and in what sense, research in phenomenology and phenomenological psychopathology has—in addition to its descriptive and hermeneutic value—explanatory power is somewhat controversial. This paper shows why it is legitimate to recognize such explanatory power. To this end, the paper analyzes two central concerns underlying the debate about explanation in phenomenology: (a) the warning against reductionism, which is implicit in a conception of causal explanation exclusively based on models of natural/physical causation; and (b) the warning against top-down generalizations, which neglect the specificity of the individual. While acknowledging that these two caveats express serious concerns regarding the debate on explanatory models, I show that phenomenology has the resources to respond to them. These can be found in analyses of different types of causation relating to different regions of reality and in the structure of explanatory models based on exemplarity. On the basis of these analyses, I defend a pluralist account vis-à-vis explanatory models.

Micro-Phenomenology as Experientially Based Access to Consciousness

“…As we will see in the next section, there are further tools how to strengthen the explanatory scope of a qualitative research design, which also applies to the microphenomenological research procedure. Phenomenology rests on a descriptive research method but also searches for categorical or eidetic laws, which govern and thereby explain the general structure of our experiences (Summa 2022).…”

La hipótesis de la saliencia aberrante: unificando la neurobiología y la fenomenología de la esquizofrenia

“…En este contexto, y criticando el reduccionismo a la base de la tradición neurocognitiva dura, la tradición fenomenológica ha sugerido que el hecho fundamental que subyace a los síntomas que sirven para diagnosticar la esquizofrenia refiere a una alteración en la experiencia del sí-mismo y del mundo (Gruhle, 1915;Mayer-Gross, 1932;Jaspers, 1963;Sass y Parnas, 2003;Stanghellini, 2010;Stanghellini et al, 2019;Summa, 2022;Reynolds, 2022). Para el enfoque fenomenológico, uno de los problemas del reduccionismo neurocognitivo implica la disolución del sujeto; la invisibilización de la persona que sufre los síntomas descritos en los cientos de páginas de los manuales de diagnóstico.…”