Phenomenological Skepticism Reconsidered: A Husserlian Answer to Dennett’s Challenge

Abstract

There is a long-standing tradition of questioning the viability and scientificity of firstperson methods. Husserlian reflective methodology, in particular, has been challenged on the basis of its perceived inability to meet the standards of objectivity and reliability, leading to what has been called "phenomenological skepticism" (Roy, 2007). In this article, I reassess this line of objection by outlining Daniel C. Dennett's empirically driven skepticism and reconstructing his methodological arguments against Husserlian phenomenology. His ensuing phenomenological skepticism is divided into strong skepticism and categorical and gradual versions of weak skepticism. Both strands of Dennett's criticism are then countered by analyzing the key components of Husserl's method of phenomenological reflection: epoché and transcendental reduction, intentional analysis, eidetic variation, and intersubjective validation. Laying out the basic features of phenomenological reflection serves two purposes. First, it undermines Dennett's methodological arguments, which are based on the unfounded assumptions that Husserl is committed to introspection, methodological solipsism, the first-person-plural presumption, and the lone-wolf approach. Second, it shows how Husserl's own methodology can alleviate the more justified empirical worries concerning overinterpretation, underdescription, and disagreement. Finally, I argue that gradual weak skepticism is the only plausible form of phenomenological skepticism and conclude that Husserlian methodology is well-equipped to combat it.

Marginal Themes

“…A first point is that the main aim of phenomenology does not consist in describing particular, individual phenomena, but rather in making the structures both of subjective acts and of their corresponding realms of objects explicit; in other words, it consists in detecting the conditions of possibility of a phenomenon in any possible experience of it. Accordingly-contrary to how some critics (Dennett 1991;Metzinger 2003) tend to misinterpret it-phenomenology has absolutely nothing to do with introspection, if only because the very distinction between interior and exterior is in principle rejected (Belt 2020). The second aspect, already remarked in Husserl's Logical Investigations (Hua XVIII,193), is that any result, to be considered as such, must be traceable to evidence [Evidenz] and must relate to it as ultimate criterion of validity.…”

The Experimental Phenomenology of Perception. A Collective Reflection on the Present and Future of this Approach

“…We also wonder if some of the results emerging from studies taking this broader view of Experimental Phenomenology might help researchers to operationalise the idea of 'non-reflective self-consciousness' (for a recent discussion, see Kriegel, 2002Kriegel, , 2003Kriegel, , 2006Zahavi, 2004Zahavi, , 2005, or the reliability of first-person methods and experiments (e.g. Belt, 2020;Overgaard, Gallagher, & Ramsoy, 2008;Ramm, 2016Ramm, , 2018. There is a lot of food for thought here regarding the directions that future studies in this area might take.…”

An enactive-phenomenological response to a sensorimotor critique

“…17 A lot has been said to defend phenomenology against charges of subjectivism and introspectionism, and this is not the place to recount it all. For a couple of convincing attempts at more systematic clarifications of this issue, seeZahavi (2017) andBelt (2020).…”