Phenomenology and the Empirical Turn: a Phenomenological Analysis of Postphenomenology

Abstract

This paper provides a phenomenological analysis of postphenomenological philosophy of technology. While acknowledging that the results of its analyses are to be recognized as original, insightful, and valuable, we will argue that in its execution of the empirical turn, postphenomenology forfeits a phenomenological dimension of questioning. By contrasting the postphenomenological method with Heidegger's understanding of phenomenology as developed in his early Freiburg lectures and in Being and Time, we will show how the postphenomenological method must be understood as mediation theory, which adheres to what Heidegger calls the theoretical attitude. This leaves undiscussed how mediation theory about ontic beings (i.e.,technologies) involves a specific ontological mode of relating to beings, whereas consideration of this mode is precisely the concern of phenomenology. This ontological dimension is important to consider, since we will argue that postphenomenology is unwittingly technically mediated in an ontological way. The upshot of this is that in its dismissal of Heidegger's questioning of technology as belonging to Bclassical philosophy of technology,^postphenomenology implicitly adheres to what Heidegger calls technology as Enframing. We argue that postphenomenology overlooks its own adherence to the theoretical attitude and ultimately to Enframing, and we will conclude with calling for a phenomenological questioning of the dimension that postphenomenology presently leaves unthought, meaning that we will develop a plea for a rehabilitation of the ontological dimension in the philosophy of technology.

Toward a Terrestrial Turn in Philosophy of Technology

“…This mode is not itself a being, i.e., ontic, but ontological inasmuch as I cannot isolate myself from it to consider it objectively, but find myself included in it insofar as my encounter with the world is already structured so that things appear as objects (cf. Zwier, Blok, and Lemmens 2016). Whereas this rendition remains rather abstract, the Anthropocene offers a concrete indication of the inclusivity in the whole of Being.…”

“…Verbeek and Ihde thus take issue with the totalitarian aspect of Enframing, and in arguing that it depicts a region of beings at most, they emphasise a less reductionist and more expansive perspective on the rich intricacy of various human-technology relations (cf. Zwier, Blok, and Lemmens 2016).…”

“…12. For an elaborate discussion on Heidegger's philosophical method and the postphenomenological method of studying technologies, see Zwier, Blok, and Lemmens (2016).…”

Technology in the Age of Innovation: Responsible Innovation as a New Subdomain Within the Philosophy of Technology

“…The popularity of this view is reflected in the theme of the latest Society for Philosophy and Technology conference, which was specifically dedicated to the way in which concrete artifacts work. By narrowing the scope to concrete artifacts, this contemporary view of technology is also characterized as an ontic account of technology (Zwier et al 2016). Despite what critics say (Cf.…”

“…Despite what critics say (Cf. Feenberg 2009;Kaplan 2009;Scharff 2012;Smith 2015;Zwier et al 2016), an ontic account of technology does not mean to disregard the effects technology has on other domains, as long as these effects are studied strictly in relation to the particular technology that causes them, and not attributed to technology as such. In Moralizing Technology: Understanding and Designing the Morality of Things, Peter-Paul Verbeek provides some compelling examples that illustrate this latter point:…”