PHI: Path-Hidden Lightweight Anonymity Protocol at Network Layer

Chen, Chen; Perrig, Adrian

doi:10.1515/popets-2017-0007

Cited by 23 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…Exploiting User Behavior Exploiting Routing Changes Vanilla Tor [19] Novel ( §5. [36] Known (Resistance) [36] Novel ( §7.1) Astoria [50] Known [36] HORNET [11] Novel ( §5.4) Novel ( §7.2) Dovetail [56] Novel ( §6.2) PHI [12] Novel ( §B.2) LAP [31] Novel (implied by §5.4) Novel (implied by §7.2)…”

Section: Exploiting Client Mobilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Systems such as DeNASA, Astoria, TAPS, and Counter-RAPTOR have modified path-selection algorithms for onion routing to mitigate the threat of AS-level adversaries [4,36,50,58]. Systems such as LAP, Dovetail, PHI, and HORNET have moved cryptographic functionality for anonymous communication from end hosts into the Internet routing infrastructure to improve performance [11,12,31,56].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Onion routing protocols are run at the application layer, which allows them to be deployed without changes to the existing Internet. However, several protocols [11,12,31,56] propose operating at the network layer for efficiency and ubiquity. These protocols change the way that routers set up and route packets and thus require changes in some of the core infrastructure of the Internet.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Tempest: Temporal Dynamics in Anonymity Systems

Wails

Sun

Johnson

et al. 2018

Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies

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Many recent proposals for anonymous communication omit from their security analyses a consideration of the effects of time on important system components. In practice, many components of anonymity systems, such as the client location and network structure, exhibit changes and patterns over time. In this paper, we focus on the effect of such temporal dynamics on the security of anonymity networks. We present Tempest, a suite of novel attacks based on (1) client mobility, (2) usage patterns, and (3) changes in the underlying network routing. Using experimental analysis on real-world datasets, we demonstrate that these temporal attacks degrade user privacy across a wide range of anonymity networks, including deployed systems such as Tor; pathselection protocols for Tor such as DeNASA, TAPS, and Counter-RAPTOR; and network-layer anonymity protocols for Internet routing such as Dovetail and HORNET. The degradation is in some cases surprisingly severe. For example, a single host failure or network route change could quickly and with high certainty identify the client’s ISP to a malicious host or ISP. The adversary behind each attack is relatively weak – generally passive and in control of one network location or a small number of hosts. Our findings suggest that designers of anonymity systems should rigorously consider the impact of temporal dynamics when analyzing anonymity.

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Section: Exploiting Client Mobilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Tempest: Temporal Dynamics in Anonymity Systems

Wails

Sun

Johnson

et al. 2018

Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies

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“…Tagging is implemented in the SSL handshake protocols, by embedding a tag into the random value field in the ClientHello message. -LAP [21], Dovetail [37], HORNET [7], and PHI [8] are network-layer protocols that aim to provide lowlatency and high-throughput anonymous communication. In these protocols, the source and destination addresses are encrypted so that the intermediate routing node only knows its adjacent nodes in the path (similar to Tor).…”

Section: Background and Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Personalized Pseudonyms for Servers in the Cloud

Xiao

Reiter

Zhang

2017

Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies

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A considerable and growing fraction of servers, especially of web servers, is hosted in compute clouds. In this paper we opportunistically leverage this trend to improve privacy of clients from network attackers residing between the clients and the cloud: We design a system that can be deployed by the cloud operator to prevent a network adversary from determining which of the cloud's tenant servers a client is accessing. The core innovation in our design is a PoPSiCl (pronounced "popsicle"), a persistent pseudonym for a tenant server that can be used by a single client to access the server, whose real identity is protected by the cloud from both passive and active network attackers. When instantiated for TLS-based access to web servers, our design works with all major browsers and requires no additional client-side software and minimal changes to the client user experience. Moreover, changes to tenant servers can be hidden in supporting software (operating systems and web-programming frameworks) without imposing on web-content development. Perhaps most notably, our system boosts privacy with minimal impact to web-browsing performance, after some initial setup during a user's first access to each web server.

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“…Since the first proposal of an anonymous network by David Chaum in 1981 [1], much research has been proposed to further improve the concept either through greater anonymity [2][3] [4], or faster performance [5] [6] [7]. However focus has been on Internet users and traffic.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anonymous Data Sharing Between Organisations with Elliptic Curve Cryptography

Will

Schlickmann³

2017

2017 IEEE Trustcom/BigDataSE/Icess

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Promoting data sharing between organisations is challenging, without the added concerns over having actions traced. Even with encrypted search capabilities, the entities digital location and downloaded information can be traced, leaking information to the hosting organisation. This is a problem for law enforcement and government agencies, where any information leakage is not acceptable, especially for investigations. Anonymous routing is a technique to stop a host learning which agency is accessing information. Many related works for anonymous routing have been proposed, but are designed for Internet traffic, and are over complicated for internal usage. A streaming design for circuit creation is proposed using elliptic curve cryptography. Allowing for a simple anonymous routing solution, which provides fast performance with source and destination anonymity to other organisations.

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PHI: Path-Hidden Lightweight Anonymity Protocol at Network Layer

Cited by 23 publications

References 30 publications

Tempest: Temporal Dynamics in Anonymity Systems

Tempest: Temporal Dynamics in Anonymity Systems

Personalized Pseudonyms for Servers in the Cloud

Anonymous Data Sharing Between Organisations with Elliptic Curve Cryptography

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