Philosophical Speech Acts

Shields, Matthew

doi:10.1017/s0031819120000194

Cited by 7 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 11 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…8 For more on felicitous objections to stipulations, see Shields (2020). 9 To clarify the numbering, I have this example labeled (3) because it was the third case introduced at the beginning of the paper.…”

Section: Matthew Shieldsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

On stipulation

Shields

2021

European J of Philosophy

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

When we carry out a speech act of stipulation, it seems that we can shape our language however we see fit. This autonomy, however, also seems to make such acts arbitrary: it is unclear if there are any constraints on what counts as a "correct" or "incorrect" stipulation. In this paper, I offer a novel, detailed account of the pragmatics of stipulation and explain its crucial role in conceptual analysis and articulation. My account shows that stipulation does indeed equip us with a key tool for changing our linguistic practices, but that such acts can nonetheless count as meaningfully, normatively constrained: they are always subject to felicitous criticism and the possibility of defeat by others. I then examine the metaphilosophical implications of this account. Philosophers often describe the project of conceptual analysis as having a crucial stipulative dimension, but they rarely explain what they take this act to consist in. On my view, speech acts of stipulation are best understood as acts that generate a shared inferential entitlement for speaker and audience, an entitlement justified on the basis of its utility. In developing this account, I distinguish stipulations from more familiar speech act kinds such as assertions and commands, synthesize and criticize alternative views of stipulation in the literature, and discuss the relationship between stipulation and seemingly kindred speech acts (such as assumptions, suppositions, and proposals).

show abstract

Section: Matthew Shieldsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… Maitra complicates this picture, and there might be an interesting view of stipulation-as-fiat to be developed using the resources of her account(Maitra, 2012).4 This version of my account, also defended inShields (2020), revises the accounts inShields (2018) andShields (2019).…”

mentioning

confidence: 92%

On stipulation

Shields

2021

European J of Philosophy

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Alternatively, Ilana may be better understood as proposing an understanding of a concept—or even more specifically engaging in what Nat Hansen has recently called a “metalinguistic proposal”: “speech acts that involve an intention for an audience to come to have a reason to use or understand the use of a linguistic expression in a particular way” (2019, 1). Or consider another account: Ilana stipulates that the concept in question should be understood in a certain way (Shields 2020, 2021). According to this gloss, Ilana is aiming to generate a shared inferential entitlement for all relevant speakers to understand the concept in a specific way on the basis of the utility, rather than the truth, of this understanding.…”

Section: Suppositions Metalinguistic Proposals and Stipulationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conceptual Change and Future Paths for Pragmatism

Shields¹

2021

The Southern J of Philosophy

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The pragmatist faces the challenge of accounting for the possibility of rational conceptual change. Some pragmatists have tried to meet this challenge by appealing to Neurathian imagery-imagery that risks being too figurative to be helpful. I argue that we can develop a clearer view of what rationally constrained conceptual revision looks like for the pragmatist. I do so by examining the work of the pragmatist who in recent years has addressed this issue most directly, Richard Rorty. His attempts to solve the puzzle ultimately fall short, but prove instructive. Rorty characterizes inter-language transitions in exclusively causal terms because, along with the very philosophical traditions he criticizes, he uncritically privileges the role of truth claims or assertions in our pragmatics. I show that if we instead broaden our pragmatic imaginations, we encounter various non-assertoric speech acts involved in speakers aiming to change how we make sense of our language and concepts. With these acts in view, we are able to arrive at a demystified view of rational conceptual change from a pragmatist perspective and identify future lines of inquiry for pragmatist projects.

show abstract

Towards a Unified Theory of Illocutionary Normativity

Marsili

2023

Philosophers in Depth

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Philosophical Speech Acts

Cited by 7 publications

References 11 publications

On stipulation

On stipulation

Conceptual Change and Future Paths for Pragmatism

Towards a Unified Theory of Illocutionary Normativity

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About