Philosophy of nature and organism’s autonomy: on Hegel, Plessner and Jonas’ theories of living beings

Abstract

Following the revival in the last decades of the concept of "organism", scholarly literature in philosophy of science has shown growing historical interest in the theory of Immanuel Kant, one of the "fathers" of the concept of self-organisation. Yet some recent theoretical developments suggest that self-organisation alone cannot fully account for the all-important dimension of autonomy of the living. Autonomy appears to also have a genuine "interactive" dimension, which concerns the organism's functional interactions with the environment and does not simply derive from its internal organisation. Against this background, we focus on a family of natural philosophical approaches that historically have already strongly taken in account this aspect of autonomy, notably going beyond Kant's perspective on self-organisation. We thus review Hegel, Plessner, and Jonas' different perspectives on living beings, focussing in particular on four points: the distinction between organic and inorganic, the theory of biological organisation, the processuality of the living, and the "boundary" between inside and outside, through which the organism establishes its relationship to the environment. We, then, compare the three perspectives on these four points, and finally address the question of what advantages their contribution present-especially compared to Kant's theory-with respect to the topic of organism's autonomy. This could help-we hope-to better understand what is at the stake still today.

The Dialectics of Free Energy Minimization

“…While some attention has been devoted to the relationship between dialectics in general and predictive processing (Bolis and Schilbach, 2018), an investigation into the specifically Hegelian legacy at work in free energy minimization is long overdue. Especially since the connections between Hegelian dialectics and the notions of self-organization and autopoiesis are well-established (Žižek, 2006, 2012; Michelini, 2012; Marques, 2016; Michelini et al, 2018).…”

“…The animal organism’s shape [ Gestalt ] is in turn comprised of three constitutive moments: (1) “its simple, universal being-within-self in its externality [ allgemeines Insichsein in seiner Äußerlichkeit ]”; “it is an undivided identity of the subject with itself—sensibility”; (2) “a capacity for being stimulated from outside and the subject’s own reaction outwards to the stimulation—irritability”; and (3) “the unity of these moments, the negative return to itself from its relation with the outside world, and, through this, the production [ Erzeugung ] and positing [ Setzen ] of itself as a singular—reproduction, which is the reality and the basis of the first two moments” (Hegel, 1830/2004; p. 357, §353; see Michelini et al, 2018, Figure 1, for a full schematic overview of the animal organism in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature ).…”

“…The animal’s relation to food makes up the most elementary example of this process. As the organism strives to overcome the deficiency of hunger, it passes through the three stages of sensibility, irritability, and reproduction in the corresponding sequence of hunger, ingestion, and digestion (Michelini et al, 2018; p. 8). As such, the organism reproduces itself through the ingestion and subsequent digestion of food.…”

Enactivism and the Hegelian Stance on Intrinsic Purposiveness

“…By relying on this distinction, the theory of autonomy argues that references to teleological notions are not just heuristic shortcuts and that, instead, biology and cognitive science should integrate a naturalized account of intrinsic purposiveness into their theoretical framework. A convergence between the Hegelian stance and the theory of autonomy with respect to their understanding of intrinsic purposiveness has been increasingly emphasized in the literature (Michelini, 2012;Michelini et al, 2018;Gambarotto & Illetterati, 2020). In fact, some recent contributions portray Hegel as endorsing an account of biological functions consistent with the "organizational" account stemming from the theory of autonomy (Cooper, 2020;Maraguat, 2020).…”

The ‘Is’ and the ‘Ought’ of the Animal Organism: Hegel’s Account of Biological Normativity

“…Cf Mossio & Bich (2017). Bich & Mossio (2011), Montévil & Mossio (2015 Michelini et al (2018). expand this narrative.…”