The construction and operational costs of drainage projects are high. Traditional construction management models impose significant financial pressure on the government and reduce stakeholder motivation. Within the market-oriented development context, reforming the construction management model is crucial for breaking the current predicament. This research establishes a framework for the market-oriented construction management model for drainage projects and constructs a behavioral strategy evolutionary game model involving government, drainage management companies, and pollution discharge subjects. Through theoretical analyses and simulations, this research presents recommendations for the implementation of the market-oriented model. The research findings indicate that: (1) the market-oriented model is feasible both theoretically and practically. Pollution rights trading aids pollution discharge subjects in adapting to the market-oriented model. (2) Ensuring sewage charges remain within the interval [P1, P1 + L2 − L1] is crucial for trilateral cooperation. (3) Simulation analysis shows that intensifying policy support, reducing the cost of technological equipment upgrades, enhancing comprehensive income, lowering the pricing of sewage charges, and raising initial selection probability all promote a tendency towards ESS.