Phylogenetic footprints in organizational behavior

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractAn evolutionary tool kit is applied in this paper to explain how innate social behavior traits evolved in early human groups. These traits were adapted to the particular production requirements of the group in human phylogeny. They shaped the group members' attitudes towards contributing to the group's goals and towards other group members. We argue that these attitudes are still present in modern humans and leave their "phylogenetic footprints" also in present-day organizational life. We discuss the implications of this hypothesis for problems arising in firm organizations in relation to the coordination and motivation of organization members.

The Pyramid Fallacy: Self-Organizing Decentralized Open Systems for Sustainable Collective Action

“…It is argued that this significant shift laid the economic basis for revolutionary changes, including the institutional change (Richerson et al, 2003) that manifested cooperation in anonymous large systems. Existing prior to the agricultural system, the structure of hunter-gatherer societies as described by Boehm (1993) was egalitarian, in contrast to the central polities of contemporary societies where the power of decision-making is delegated to a relatively steady, institutionalized leadership (see also Lee & Daly, 1999;Witt & Schwesinger, 2013). Boehm's (1993) evolutionary theory suggests that in hunter-gatherer societies individuals had substantial autonomy, a considerable voice in community affairs, and could enforce fair, responsive behavior in their leaders (Boehm, 1993;Richerson et al, 2003).…”

“…The researchers posit that these factors both increase group member commitment when a task is assigned (especially when assigned by consensus, and facilitate the development of an attitude for which accomplishing the assigned tasks is a major element of reward. Ambivalence toward behavior traits tied to self-interest motives can still disrupt this process by degrading the motivational mechanism that enables such decentralized structures (Witt and Schwesinger, 2013 Lerner and Tirole (2002): Why would thousands of top-notch software developers contribute for free to the creation of a public good? Through extensive research conducted in this field, scholars have identified the dominant role of self-interest motivation as determining contributions to OSS.…”

“…In the same vein, Witt and Schwesinger (2013) suggest that the genetic preference for egalitarianism must have still been present in those who were now possibly unwilling subordinates, which could explain the propensity to violent revolt against hierarchical leaders and the ensuing severe punishment of those who revolted, designed to discourage such behavior. The researchers suggest that a subtler enforcement of the hierarchical structure came from the labeling of domination and submission as the "natural" and "God-given" form of social organization.…”

An analysis of operational risk events in US and European Banks 2008–2014

“…Cladistics is the classification method developed in biology to hypothesise relationships between organisms. This method is widely applied to non-biological systems, including the study of language (Rexová et al ., 2006), business (Goumagias et al ., 2014), organisational behaviour (Witt & Schwesinger, 2013) and other fields.…”

Prior Commitment and Uncertainty in Complex Economic Systems: Reinstating History in the Core of Economic Analysis

“…12 However, some bio-economists argue that the capacity to behave in these ways is also a product of genetically inherited factors. See, for example, Witt and Schwesinger (2013). 13 Mokyr (2002) the novelty involved ensures that there is uncertainty.…”