Physical Layer Authentication in Nano Networks at Terahertz Frequencies for Biomedical Applications

Rahman, Muhammad Mahboob Ur; Abbasi, Qammer H.; Chopra, Nishtha; Qaraqe, Khalid; Alomainy, Akram

doi:10.1109/access.2017.2700330

Cited by 37 publications

(34 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…in [242] addresses the security needs of the micro-macro link of a body area network. In [243], the authors consider a scenario where an onbody nano device communicates with inside-body nano device, while a malicious node attempts to send malicious/harmful data to the inside-body node. To this end, the authors utilize the measured pathloss as the fingerprint of transmit nano device to do the authentication at the physical layer.…”

Section: B Security In Em Based Nano Networkmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Comprehensive Survey on Hybrid Communication in Context of Molecular Communication and Terahertz Communication for Body-Centric Nanonetworks

Yang

Deng

et al. 2020

IEEE Trans. Mol. Biol. Multi-Scale Commun.

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Section: B Security In Em Based Nano Networkmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Comprehensive Survey on Hybrid Communication in Context of Molecular Communication and Terahertz Communication for Body-Centric Nanonetworks

Yang

Deng

et al. 2020

IEEE Trans. Mol. Biol. Multi-Scale Commun.

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“…In [79,80], application of channel fingerprints based physical layer authentication was studied in the MIMO system and IoT system, respectively. Another study [81] analyzed the challenges of introducing such an authentication mechanism into the terahertz network, and further designed corresponding methods according to specific channel characteristics. In addition, to simplify the authentication procedure and reduce handover authentication latency and complexity, studies [82,83] applied channel fingerprints based physical layer authentication into SDN-based heterogeneous network, by extracting the channel characteristics as security context information.…”

Section: Physical Layer Authenticationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Overview of 5G security technology

Huang

Jin

et al. 2018

Sci. China Inf. Sci.

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The 5th-generation mobile communication system (5G) has higher security requirements than previous systems. Accordingly, international standard organizations, operators, and equipment manufacturers are focusing extensively on 5G security technology. This paper analyzes the security requirements of 5G business applications, network architecture, the air interface, and user privacy. The development trends of 5G security architecture are summarized, with a focus on endogenous defense architecture, which represents a new trend in 5G security development. Several incremental 5G security technologies are reviewed, including physical layer security, lightweight encryption, network slice security, user privacy protection, and block chain technology applied to 5G.

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“…PLA exploits the random features of the propagation medium which are nearly impossible to clone unless and until the malicious node is co-located with the legitimate node whose probability is almost zero in practice. To date, there are various features reported for physical layer authentication, e.g., received signal strength [6], channel impulse response [7], [8] channel frequency response [9], carrier frequency offset [10], pathloss [11] and I/Q imbalance [12] etc. More recently, distance, angle and position of the transmit node were reported in [10] to thwart the impersonation attack in an underwater acoustic sensor network.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Preventing Identity Attacks in RFID Backscatter Communication Systems: A Physical-layer Approach

Mehmood

Aman

Rahman

et al. 2020

2020 International Conference on UK-China Emerging Technologies (UCET)

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This work considers identity attack on a radio-frequency identification (RFID)-based backscatter communication system. Specifically, we consider a singlereader, single-tag RFID system whereby the reader and the tag undergo two-way signaling which enables the reader to extract the tag ID in order to authenticate the legitimate tag (L-tag). We then consider a scenario whereby a malicious tag (M-tag)-having the same ID as the Ltag programmed in its memory by a wizard-attempts to deceive the reader by pretending to be the L-tag. To this end, we counter the identity attack by exploiting the non-reciprocity of the end-to-end channel (i.e., the residual channel) between the reader and the tag as the fingerprint of the tag. The passive nature of the tag(s) (and thus, lack of any computational platform at the tag) implies that the proposed lightweight physical-layer authentication method is implemented at the reader. To be concrete, in our proposed scheme, the reader acquires the raw data via two-way (challenge-response) message exchange mechanism, does least-squares estimation to extract the fingerprint, and does binary hypothesis testing to do authentication. We also provide closed-form expressions for the two error probabilities of interest (i.e., false alarm and missed detection). Simulation results attest to the efficacy of the proposed method.

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Physical Layer Authentication in Nano Networks at Terahertz Frequencies for Biomedical Applications

Cited by 37 publications

References 20 publications

A Comprehensive Survey on Hybrid Communication in Context of Molecular Communication and Terahertz Communication for Body-Centric Nanonetworks

A Comprehensive Survey on Hybrid Communication in Context of Molecular Communication and Terahertz Communication for Body-Centric Nanonetworks

Overview of 5G security technology

Preventing Identity Attacks in RFID Backscatter Communication Systems: A Physical-layer Approach

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