Physicalism Deconstructed

Morris, Kevin

doi:10.1017/9781108662178

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 162 publications

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“…For related critiques of supervenience-based versions of nonreductive physicalism, see Horgan 1993 andWilson 2005. While I believe that supervenience is not the key to securing a viable nonreductive physicalism, I also believe that the issues here are more nuanced than certain discussions suggest; for discussion, see Howell 2009and Morris 2018aand 2018b. 6 See Kim 1998 For related ideas, see Lewis 1966, Heil 2003, and Morris 2018b Second, Kim argued that nonreductive physicalism cannot make sense of the causal efficacy of putative higher-level items, focusing his case on the issue of mental causation, the causal efficacy of mental items like thoughts, beliefs, desires, and experiences.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

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What’s Wrong With Nonreductive Physicalism? The Exclusion Problem Reconsidered

Morris¹

2022

ProtoSociology

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Jaegwon Kim argued that nonreductive physicalism faces the “exclusion problem” for higher- level causation, mental causation in particular. Roughly, the charge is that given the presumptive ubiquity of physical causation, there cannot be irreducible mental causes for physical effects. Since there are mental causes, Kim concluded that nonreductive physicalism should be rejected in favor of a more reductionist alternative according to which mental causes are just physical causes differently described. But why should mental causes be “excluded” in this way? Unfortunately, Kim had less to say about this than one might expect. After reviewing some of Kim’s proposals, I suggest that the exclusion problem should be premised on nothing more or less than Occamist, simplicity-based considerations. I apply this conception of the exclusion problem to some prominent responses to Kim’s critique of nonreductive physicalism and argue that this conception mandates reconsidering the success of these responses.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…Bennett 2003 and. I discuss Bennett's approach to the exclusion problem in more detail inMorris 2015and 2018b. 13 See Kim 1998.…”

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confidence: 99%

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What’s Wrong With Nonreductive Physicalism? The Exclusion Problem Reconsidered

Morris¹

2022

ProtoSociology

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“…There is therefore no way of weakening Intersection without running afoul of either Identity or Individuation. 17 Moreover, and as Kim (2010) and Morris (2019) argue, positing distinct mental causal powers is inconsistent with physicalism. See also Wilson (2011).…”

Section: The Chauvinism Of Intersectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A familiar dilemma for the subset theory of realization

Rellihan

2021

Philosophical Books

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I argue that the subset theory of property realization cannot account for both the multiple realizability and causal efficacy of mental properties. It avoids the threat of causal exclusion by identifying every power of a realized property with some power of its realizer, but this entails that the different realizers of a multiply realizable property share their causal powers, and this just isn't so. A counterexample is produced as evidence. Thus, in its original form, the theory fails to account for the multiple realizability of mental properties. The theory can be amended to account for multiple realizability, but these amendments undermine its account of mental causation and thereby reintroduce the problem of causal exclusion. The subset theory is thus caught between the horns of a familiar dilemma for physicalist theories of mind.

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Nicht-reduktiver Physikalismus

Hüttemann

2024

Handbuch Philosophie Des Geistes

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Physicalism Deconstructed

Cited by 7 publications

References 162 publications

What’s Wrong With Nonreductive Physicalism? The Exclusion Problem Reconsidered

What’s Wrong With Nonreductive Physicalism? The Exclusion Problem Reconsidered

A familiar dilemma for the subset theory of realization

Nicht-reduktiver Physikalismus

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