Physical interaction with a partner plays an essential role in our life experience and is 1 the basis of many daily activities. When two physically coupled humans have different 2 and partly conflicting goals, they face the challenge of negotiating some type of 3 collaboration. This requires that both subjects understand their opponent's state and 4 current actions. But, how would the collaboration be affected if information about their 5 opponent were unreliable or incomplete? Here we show that incomplete information 6 about the partner affects not only the speed at which a collaborative strategy is 7 achieved (less information, slower learning), but also the modality of the collaboration.
8In particular, incomplete or unreliable information leads to an interaction strategy 9 characterized by alternating leader-follower roles. In contrast, more reliable information 10 leads to a more synchronous behavior, in which no specific roles can be identified.
11Simulations based on a combination of game theory and Bayesian estimation suggested 12 that synchronous behaviors denote optimal interaction (Nash equilibrium). Roles 13 emerge as sub-optimal forms of interaction, which minimize the need to know about the 14 partner. These findings suggest that physical interaction strategies are shaped by the 15 trade-off of between the task requirements and the uncertainty of the information 16 available about the opponent.
17Author summary 18 Many activities in daily life involve physical interaction with a partner or opponent. In 19 many situations they have conflicting goals. Therefore, they need to negotiate some 20 form of collaboration. Although very common, these situations have rarely been studied 21 empirically. In this study, we specifically address what is a 'optimal' collaboration and 22 how it can be achieved. We also address how developing a collaboration is affected by 23 uncertainty about the partner. Through a combination of empirical studies and 24 computer simulations based on game theory, we show that subject pairs (dyads) are 25 capable of developing stable collaborations, but the learned collaboration strategy 26 depends on the reliability of the information about the partner. High-information dyads 27 converge to the optimal strategies in game-theoretic sense. Low-information dyads 28 converge to strategies that minimize the need to know about the partner. These 29 findings are consistent with a game theoretic learning model which relies on estimates of 30 partner actions, but not partner goals. This similarity sheds some light on the minimal 31 computational machinery which is necessary to an intelligent agent in order to develop 32 stable physical collaborations. 33 July 14, 2018 1/16 36 carrying a load or a therapist interacting with a patient are just the first examples 37 which come to mind. In all these situations, each participant in the interaction needs to 38 know what his/her partner is doing and/or intends to do. On this basis, he/she must 39 then select their own action [1, 2]. To do this, the ...