2016
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.09.005
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Physician ownership of complementary medical services

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Cited by 20 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…Iizuka () finds that physicians in vertically integrated clinics prescribe more branded drugs (in order to capture mark‐up) than other physicians. Similarly, Chen, Gertler and Yang () exploit a policy reform in Taiwan that restricted physician ownership of pharmacies. They find that physicians who had to give up ownership of their pharmacy prescribed 7 per cent less drugs.…”
Section: Medical Labour Supplymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Iizuka () finds that physicians in vertically integrated clinics prescribe more branded drugs (in order to capture mark‐up) than other physicians. Similarly, Chen, Gertler and Yang () exploit a policy reform in Taiwan that restricted physician ownership of pharmacies. They find that physicians who had to give up ownership of their pharmacy prescribed 7 per cent less drugs.…”
Section: Medical Labour Supplymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For-profit providers may be concerned that these negative judgments, and their overall reputation, can reduce the likelihood of patients returning for subsequent visits, which can affect their bottom line. Prescribing behaviours that arise from these concerns may vary based on the extent to which medicines demanded are harmful or perceived as such and, in the private sector, profitable 4–8. In this paper, we study the effects of patients demanding two different inappropriate medicines, as examples of trade-offs providers might make between risks, profits, and patient satisfaction 6 7 9 10…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…1 On the other hand, agrodealers might purposefully under-provide quality (Bold et al, 2017;Ashour et al, 2019). Or they may recommend products that maximize their own profits instead of customer welfare, as has been observed in numerous other sectors (Hubbard, 1998;Inderst and Ottaviani, 2009;Mullainathan, Noeth, and Schoar, 2012;Chen, Gertler, and Yang, 2016;Anagol, Cole, and Sarkar, 2017). These concerns about securing through agrodealers adoption of the right technologies by the right farmers are akin to concerns about the quality of public services provided by the private sector (Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%