Physics and Causation

Esfeld, Michael

doi:10.1007/s10701-009-9357-y

Cited by 9 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 53 publications

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“…In current research in the philosophy of physics a case is being made for the causal power of dispositions, or potentialities; this is laid out in the context of the quantum measurement problem in a contribution to this Festschrift by M. Esfeld[37].…”

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confidence: 99%

Unsharp Quantum Reality

Busch

Jaeger

2010

Found Phys

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ABSTRACT. The positive operator (valued) measures (POMs) allow one to generalize the notion of observable beyond the traditional one based on projection valued measures (PVMs). Here, we argue that this generalized conception of observable enables a consistent notion of unsharp reality and with it a concept of joint properties. A property manifests itself as an element of unsharp reality by its power, or tendency, of becoming actual or actualizing a specific measurement outcome, where this tendency of actualization is quantified by the associated quantum probability. The resulting single-case interpretation of probability as a degree of reality will be explained in detail and its role in addressing the tensions between quantum and classical accounts of the physical world will be elucidated. It will be shown that potentiality can be viewed as a causal agency that evolves in a well-defined way.

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confidence: 99%

Unsharp Quantum Reality

Busch

Jaeger

2010

Found Phys

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“…On this view, causal relations are built into the nature of physical properties themselves, even if they do not appear overtly in the laws. See Esfeld () for a defense of dispositionalism that emphasizes its anti‐Russellian implications, and Saatsi () for a rejoinder. Another relevant issue is the question of the nature of laws and time.…”

Section: Challenges To Neo‐russellianismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Physics and Causation

Blanchard

2016

Philosophy Compass

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More than a century ago, Russell launched a forceful attack on causation, arguing not only that modern physics has no need for causal notions but also that our belief in causation is a relic of a pre‐scientific view of the world. He thereby initiated a debate about the relations between physics and causation that remains very much alive today. While virtually everybody nowadays rejects Russell's causal eliminativism, many philosophers (although by no means all) have been convinced by Russell that the fundamental physical structure of our world doesn't contain causal relations. This raises the question of how to reconcile the central role of causal concepts in the special sciences and in common sense with the putative absence of causation in fundamental physics.

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“…9 If these laws have a causal interpretation, then OSR could be thought to converge with Causal Structuralism. Indeed, as already mentioned, OSR has been given a causal spin by some of its more recent advocates, who effectively aim to converge the two structuralist lines of thought (Esfeld 2009;Esfeld and Lam 2008;Esfeld 2010;Esfeld and Lam 2011). The convergence is motivated on various grounds, with the claimed benefit, for example, of being able to account for the modal nature of physical struc-6 Cf.…”

Section: Causal Structuralismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One of the loopholes hinges on the possibility of grounding the time-asymmetry of causationthereby undermining at least the 'directionality argument'-in the spontaneous localisations of the quantum wavefunction in the GRW interpretation. According to Esfeld (2009Esfeld ( , 2010 these spontaneous localisations are also something that can be interpreted in dispositional, causal terms. 23…”

Section: Osr and Quantum Dispositionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Structuralism with and without causation

Saatsi

2014

Synthese

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This paper explores the status of causation in structuralist metaphysics of physics. What role (if any) does causation play in understanding 'structure' in ontological structural realism? I address this question by examining, in a structuralist setting, arguments for and against the idea that fundamental physics deals, perhaps exclusively, with causal properties. I will argue (against Esfeld, Dorato and others) that a structuralist interpretation of fundamental physics should diverge from 'causal structuralism'. Nevertheless, causation outside fundamental physics, and the basic motivation for causal structuralism outside fundamental physics, can be captured with an appropriate conception of causation.

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Physics and Causation

Cited by 9 publications

References 53 publications

Unsharp Quantum Reality

Unsharp Quantum Reality

Physics and Causation

Structuralism with and without causation

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