Physiology of free will

Hallett, Mark

doi:10.1002/ana.24657

Cited by 34 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…Studies of this sort have yielded models of brain function in terms of both plausibility and topographic and temporal realization in the human brain. An example is the review on the recently widely debated issue of “free will” ( Hallett, 2016). …”

Section: From Neuroscientific To Anthropological Dimensions Of Believingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Processes of believing: Where do they come from? What are they good for?

Seitz

Paloutzian

Angel³

2017

F1000Res

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Despite the long scholarly discourse in Western theology and philosophy on religion, spirituality, and faith, explanations of what a belief and what believing is are still lacking. Recently, cognitive neuroscience research addressed the human capacity of believing. We present evidence suggesting that believing is a human brain function which results in probabilistic representations with attributes of personal meaning and value and thereby guides individuals' behavior. We propose that the same mental processes operating on narratives and rituals constitute belief systems in individuals and social groups. Our theoretical model of believing is suited to account for secular and non-secular belief formation. SummaryAlthough largely neglected in contemporary science, we will show that believing is a fundamental brain function on which individual and societal behavior is grounded.

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Section: From Neuroscientific To Anthropological Dimensions Of Believingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Processes of believing: Where do they come from? What are they good for?

Seitz

Paloutzian

Angel³

2017

F1000Res

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“…Collectively, our results demonstrate that lesions in different locations causing disordered volition and agency localize to unique brain networks, lending insight into the neuroanatomical substrate of free will perception. free will | agency | volition | functional connectivity | lesions L ong the domain of philosophy, free will can be investigated scientifically (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6). Experiments such as those by Benjamin Libet sparked debate regarding whether free will exists or is an illusion (1)(2)(3).…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Experiments such as those by Benjamin Libet sparked debate regarding whether free will exists or is an illusion (1)(2)(3). This debate remains unsettled, but most researchers agree that we perceive our actions to be freely willed (4)(5)(6). Recent investigations have therefore focused on understanding this perception, dividing it into two processes: the intention or motivation to act, referred to as volition (5), and the sense of responsibility for one's action, referred to as agency (4).…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Many approaches have been used to identify brain regions involved in the perception of volition or agency. For example, direct electrical stimulation to some brain regions but not to others can alter free will perception (7-10) while noninvasive brain stimulation can modulate experimental measures of agency and volition (4,6,11,12). Functional neuroimaging can identify brain regions whose activity correlates with volition or agency in normal subjects (13,14) or is abnormal in patients with "disorders of free will" such as functional movement disorders, psychogenic nonepileptic seizures (PNES), or catatonia (15,16).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Lesion network localization of free will

Darby

Joutsa

Burke

et al. 2018

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

126

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Our perception of free will is composed of a desire to act (volition) and a sense of responsibility for our actions (agency). Brain damage can disrupt these processes, but which regions are most important for free will perception remains unclear. Here, we study focal brain lesions that disrupt volition, causing akinetic mutism (n = 28), or disrupt agency, causing alien limb syndrome (n = 50), to better localize these processes in the human brain. Lesion locations causing either syndrome were highly heterogeneous, occurring in a variety of different brain locations. We next used a recently validated technique termed lesion network mapping to determine whether these heterogeneous lesion locations localized to specific brain networks. Lesion locations causing akinetic mutism all fell within one network, defined by connectivity to the anterior cingulate cortex. Lesion locations causing alien limb fell within a separate network, defined by connectivity to the precuneus. Both findings were specific for these syndromes compared with brain lesions causing similar physical impairments but without disordered free will. Finally, our lesion-based localization matched network localization for brain stimulation locations that disrupt free will and neuroimaging abnormalities in patients with psychiatric disorders of free will without overt brain lesions. Collectively, our results demonstrate that lesions in different locations causing disordered volition and agency localize to unique brain networks, lending insight into the neuroanatomical substrate of free will perception. free will | agency | volition | functional connectivity | lesions

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“…Critically, in the above studies, subjects were told to arbitrarily move their right hand or flex 69 their right wrist; or they were instructed to arbitrarily move either the right or left hand 70 (Haggard, 2008;Hallett, 2016;Roskies, 2010). Thus, their decisions when and which hand to 71 move were always unreasoned, purposeless, and bereft of any real consequence.…”

Section: Introduction 45mentioning

confidence: 99%

Neural precursors of deliberate and arbitrary decisions in the study of voluntary action

Maoz

2017

Preprint

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The onset of the readiness potential (RP)-a key neural correlate of upcoming action-was repeatedly found to precede subjects' reports of having made an internal decision. This has been taken by some as evidence against a causal role for consciousness in human decision-making and thus as a denial of free-will. Yet those studies focused on purposeless, unreasoned, arbitrary decisions, bereft of consequences. It remains unknown to what degree these specific neural precursors of action generalize to deliberate decisions, which are more ecological and relevant to real life. We therefore directly compared the neural correlates of deliberate and arbitrary decisionmaking during a $1000-donation task to non-profit organizations. While we found the expected RPs for arbitrary decisions, they were strikingly absent for deliberate ones. Our results are congruent with the RP representing the accumulation of noisy, random fluctuations, which drive arbitrary-but not deliberate-decisions. The absence of RPs in deliberate decisions further points to different neural mechanisms underlying deliberate and arbitrary decisions and thus challenges the generalizability of studies that argue for no causal role for consciousness in decision making from arbitrary to deliberate, real-life decisions.peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. All rights reserved. No reuse allowed without permission.The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not . http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/097626 doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Jan. 1, 2017;Page 2 of 17 Significance StatementThe extent of human free will is among the most hotly contended, long-standing debates in the history of human thought. Previous studies demonstrated that neural precursors of upcoming actions-especially the EEG readiness potential component-precede subjects' reports of having decided to move. Some took this as evidence against free-will. However, these experiments focused on arbitrary decisions-e.g., randomly raising the left or right hand. We directly compared neural precursors of deliberate decisions (actual $1000 donations to NPOs) and arbitrary ones, and found readiness potentials before arbitrary decisions, but-critically-not before deliberate decisions. This supports the interpretation of readiness potentials as byproducts of accumulation of random fluctuations in arbitrary but not deliberate decisions. It also points to different neural mechanisms underlying deliberate and arbitrary decisions and thus challenges the generalizability of previous neuroscientific studies of arbitrary decisions to deliberate ones.peer-reviewed)

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Physiology of free will

Cited by 34 publications

References 41 publications

Processes of believing: Where do they come from? What are they good for?

Processes of believing: Where do they come from? What are they good for?

Lesion network localization of free will

Neural precursors of deliberate and arbitrary decisions in the study of voluntary action

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