Picky losers and carefree winners prevail in collective risk dilemmas with partner selection

Santos, Fernando P.; Mascarenhas, Samuel; Santos, Francisco C.; Correia, Filipa; Gomes, Samuel; Paiva, Ana

doi:10.1007/s10458-020-09463-w

Cited by 14 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 62 publications

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“…For the uniform distribution of group size, i.e., all the formed groups have five agents, the frequency of cooperation is less than 1/2 even when the value of r up to 18. When the range of the random size distribution becomes wider, , g [2,8] , g [3,7] ,…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Cooperation in public goods game in populations of dynamic groups with varying evolution time scales

Xu¹,

Zhang²

2023

Preprint

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The cooperation in a large population engaging in the Public Goods Game (PGG) is investigated. Agents have two strategies to choose, i.e., to cooperate or to defect. These agents are temporally formed into groups for playing the PGG. The group sizes are randomly distributed and the payoffs obtained by the two-type agents after playing the games are related to the strategy selection implemented by the death-birth process. The time scales between the interactions of the agents and the strategy update are also considered. We find that the frequency of cooperation as a function of the game parameter is greatly affected by the group size distributions and the time scales of the evolutionary dynamics. At some cases, the cooperative behavior can be analytically solved. In this model, a mixed state with coexistence of cooperators and defectors and a totally cooperative state are observed. The critical game parameter, above which a totally cooperative state will occur, is obtained by an analytical treatment or analyzed by the last-surviving pattern. When the process of the strategy selection is fast, the critical game parameter for the emergence of an AllC state depends on the size scope of the group size distribution and the time scale of the interactions via grouping dynamics. At slow strategy selection, the critical game parameter approaches to rely on the mean group size of the dynamically formed groups. All the theoretical results are verified by computer simulations and they are in a good agreement.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The evolutionary game theory is a powerful tool to discover and understand the competition behavior in nature [2,[7][8][9][10]. Several important mechanisms that may cause the emergence of cooperation among selfish individuals have been discovered [2,3,[11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation in public goods game in populations of dynamic groups with varying evolution time scales

Xu¹,

Zhang²

2023

Preprint

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“…In future work, we will consider how commitments can solve more complex collective problems, for example, in a technological innovation race (Han et al, 2020), bargaining games (Rand et al, 2013;Zisis et al, 2015), climate change actions (Barrett, 2007;F. P. Santos et al, 2020) and cross-sector coordination (F. P. Santos et al, 2016), where there might be a large number of desirable outcomes or equilibriums, especially when the number of players in an interaction increases (Duong & Han, 2016;Gokhale & Traulsen, 2010).…”

Section: Conclusion and Further Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Conclusion and Further Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution of coordination in pairwise and multi-player interactions via prior commitments

Ogbo

Elragig

2021

Adaptive Behavior

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Upon starting a collective endeavour, it is important to understand your partners’ preferences and how strongly they commit to a common goal. Establishing a prior commitment or agreement in terms of posterior benefits and consequences from those engaging in it provides an important mechanism for securing cooperation. Resorting to methods from Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT), here we analyse how prior commitments can also be adopted as a tool for enhancing coordination when its outcomes exhibit an asymmetric payoff structure, in both pairwise and multi-party interactions. Arguably, coordination is more complex to achieve than cooperation since there might be several desirable collective outcomes in a coordination problem (compared to mutual cooperation, the only desirable collective outcome in cooperation dilemmas). Our analysis, both analytically and via numerical simulations, shows that whether prior commitment would be a viable evolutionary mechanism for enhancing coordination and the overall population social welfare strongly depends on the collective benefit and severity of competition, and more importantly, how asymmetric benefits are resolved in a commitment deal. Moreover, in multi-party interactions, prior commitments prove to be crucial when a high level of group diversity is required for optimal coordination. The results are robust for different selection intensities. Overall, our analysis provides new insights into the complexity and beauty of behavioural evolution driven by humans’ capacity for commitment, as well as for the design of self-organised and distributed multi-agent systems for ensuring coordination among autonomous agents.

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“…Social network analysis has been used to derive and extract systems of reputation [44,40], to explain the emergence of cooperation [14,45] or conventions [1] and to explore mechanisms of ostracism [38]. Networks have also been used as a policy/control tool to prevent polarisation [50], to promote cooperation via partner selection [49,48] while also being an emergent property out of reciprocity [36].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enabling Imitation-Based Cooperation in Dynamic Social Networks

Bara¹,

Turrini²,

Andrighetto³

2022

Preprint

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The emergence of cooperation among self-interested agents has been a key concern of the multi-agent systems community for decades. With the increased importance of network-mediated interaction, researchers have shifted the attention on the impact of social networks and their dynamics in promoting or hindering cooperation, drawing various context-dependent conclusions. For example, some lines of research, theoretical and experimental, suggest the existence of a threshold effect in the ratio of timescales of network evolution, after which cooperation will emerge, whereas other lines dispute this, suggesting instead a Goldilocks zone. In this paper we provide an evolutionary game theory framework to understand coevolutionary processes from a bottom up perspective -in particular the emergence of a cooperator-core and defector-periphery -clarifying the impact of partner selection and imitation strategies in promoting cooperative behaviour, without assuming underlying communication or reputation mechanisms. In doing so we provide a unifying framework to study imitation-based cooperation in dynamic social networks and show that disputes in the literature can in fact coexist in so far as the results stem from different equally valid assumptions.

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Picky losers and carefree winners prevail in collective risk dilemmas with partner selection

Cited by 14 publications

References 62 publications

Cooperation in public goods game in populations of dynamic groups with varying evolution time scales

Cooperation in public goods game in populations of dynamic groups with varying evolution time scales

Evolution of coordination in pairwise and multi-player interactions via prior commitments

Enabling Imitation-Based Cooperation in Dynamic Social Networks

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